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INTRODUCTION

Every-day life of businesses and consumers is pervaded by the
references to global private standards: from the cars we drive to the
computers we use, from the food we eat to the movies we watch.
Private rule-making at the transnational level is increasingly gaining
scope and traction, quickly expanding in both old and new
territories, from e-commerce to data protection, from food safety to
human rights protection, from financial markets to environment,
from professional regulation to corruption and anti-money
laundering, from civil aviation to private security. This is partly the
result of weaknesses in conventional international public law and
partly the result of the emergence of new modes of governance.
Stimulated by the actions of states and private actors, these new
modes of governance include public, private, and hybrid
instruments.1
Private actors engage in transnational rulemaking in different
forms depending on their objectives, the geographical and
functional scope, and the effects of the regimes on the entities being
regulated.2 Some regimes have personal scope since they apply to
supply chains wherever their participants are located. Other
regimes have territorial scope and concern, for example, advertising
in the UK, or lawyering in Europe.
Private regimes can both set standards for supply chains or
design and regulate markets. On the one hand, there are standards
concerning firms - in particular multinational corporations (MNCs)
- regulating their own activities and even governance in order to
ensure compliance in multiple jurisdictions.3 On the other hand,
1
For example, agreements and memoranda of understanding between
international organizations and private actors whose legal status is neither that of
exchange contract nor that of an international treaty.
2
See Fabrizio Cafaggi, A Comparative Analysis of Transnational Private
Regulation: Legitimacy, Quality, Effectiveness and Enforcement, 8 (Eur. U. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 15/2014, 2014), http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/
1814/33591), [hereinafter A Comparative Analysis]; TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI,
THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY 18 (2011); Tim Büthe, Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A
(P)Review, 12 BUS. & POL. 1 (2010); David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation,
11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI., 261, 263 (2008); JOHN BRAITHWAITHE & PETER DRAHOS,
GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000).
3
See OECD, INTERCONNECTED ECONOMIES: BENEFITING FROM GLOBAL VALUE
CHAINS, (2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/interconnectedeconomies-GVCs-synthesis.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
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there is a proliferation of new markets privately designed and
regulated via international electronic platforms.
The more
conventional stock and commodities exchanges are now
complemented by electronic trading platforms regulated by private
firms, associations, by cooperatives where multiple buyers and
sellers exchange goods and services.
The emergence of many regulatory regimes is frequently driven
by the changes in global value chains (GVCs) and in international
trade.4 GVCs have become the locus of policy implementation
concerning regulatory issues, since they increasingly trade services
and transfer technical and managerial capabilities from buyers to
suppliers.5 Donors, like international institutions, often endow GVC
leaders with resources to promote policies aimed at facilitating
smallholders’ access to international markets, reducing poverty, and
improving environmental conditions on the basis of private
standards.6 International regulatory policies incorporated in private
standards are implemented through different forms of cooperation
between international organizations, MNCs, and civil society
organizations (CSOs).7
4 See Gary Gereffi, Global Value Chains in a Post-Washington Consensus World,
21 REV. INT’L POL. ECON., (2014); Stefano Ponte & Timothy Sturgeon, Explaining
Governance in Global Value Chains: A Modular Building Theory Effort, 21 REV. INT’L
POL. ECON., 79, 86 (2014); Gary Gereffi et al., The Governance of Global Value Chains,
12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON., (2005) [hereinafter Governance of GVC].
5
See OECD, WTO, & WORLD BANK GROUP, GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS:
CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICIES (2014), http://www.
oecd.org/tad/gvc_report_g20_july_2014.pdf; WTO, TEMASEK FOUNDATION & FUNG
GLOBAL INSTITUTE, GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN A CHANGING WORLD (Deborah Elms &
Patrick
Low
eds.,
2013),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/
booksp_e/aid4tradeglobalvalue13_e.pdf. (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
6
See, e.g., FAO, FAO STRATEGY FOR PARTNERSHIP WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR
(2013), http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3444e/i3444e.pdf (last visited Mar. 26,
2015); FAO, FAO Strategy for Partnership with Civil Society Organizations (2013),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3443e/i3443e.pdf; see also IFAD, DEEPENING
IFAD’S
ENGAGEMENT
WITH
THE
PRIVATE
SECTOR
(2011),
http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/104/e/EB-2011-104-R-4-Rev-1.pdf. (last visited
Mar. 26, 2015).
7
See Gary Gereffi, A Global Value Chain Perspective on Industrial Policy and
Development in Emerging Markets, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L., 433, 454 (2014) (stating
that “[p]ublic governance will likely be called upon to play a stronger role in
supplementing and reinforcing corporate codes of conduct, product certifications,
process standards, and other voluntary, non-governmental types of private
governance that have proliferated in the last two decades, and multi-stakeholder
initiatives involving both public and private actors will arise to deal with collective
action problems.”). For a broader conceptual framework, see generally, the famous
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Transnational private standards are voluntary; most of them
become binding when regulated entities subscribe to them or join
the organization managing the regime (e.g. become members). The
adoption of standards is voluntary but compliance is mandatory.8
Whether these regimes effectively monitor compliance and enforce
standards once violations arise varies across sectors.9 The focus of
these standards is regulatory.10 They regulate externalities like
environmental harms, product safety, human rights violations in
global supply chains;11 they contribute to stability and transparency
in financial markets.12 The same industry (the diamond industry for
piece by Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory
Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL
REGULATION, 44 (2009).
8
See, e.g., THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, available at http://www.equatorprinciples.com/resources/equator_principles_III.pdf (last accessed Mar. 26, 2015)
(stating “(5) b): Adoption of the principles by a financial institution is voluntary but
once such adoption has been made, the adopting entity must take all appropriate
steps to implement and comply with the principles,” and drawing the distinction
between transnational private regulation and international soft law).
9 See Fabrizio Cafaggi & Andrea Renda, Measuring Effectiveness of Transnational
Private Regulation, 1, 74-76 (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2508684
(last accessed Mar. 26, 2015).
10 See A Comparative Analysis, supra note 2 at 18.
11
See, e.g., THE WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, Standard Guidance: (COP 27)
Kimberley Certification Process and World Diamond Council System of Warranties at 2,
available
at
http://www.responsiblejewellery.com/files/Kimberley-ProcessCertification-Scheme-and-WDC-SoW-RJC-Guidance-draftv1.pdf (last visited Mar.
26, 2015) (“In addition to KP and SoW adherence, all diamond and jewelry industry
organizations and their members have adopted the following principles of selfregulation, obliging them to: trade ‘only with companies that include warranty
declarations on their invoices;’ not buy diamonds from suspect sources or unknown
suppliers, or which originate in countries that have not implemented the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme; not buy diamonds from any sources that, after a
legally binding due process system, have been found to have violated government
regulations restricting the trade in conflict diamonds; not buy diamonds in or from
any region that is subject to an advisory by a governmental authority indicating
that conflict diamonds are coming from or available for sale in such region, unless
diamonds have been exported from such region in compliance with the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme; not knowingly buy, sell or assist others to buy or sell
conflict diamonds; ensure that all company personnel that buy or sell diamonds are
well informed regarding trade resolutions and government regulations restricting
the trade in conflict diamonds.”).
12
See IFRS FOUNDATION, DUE PROCESS HANDBOOK (2013), http://www.ifrs.
org/DPOC/Documents/2013/Due_Process_Handbook_Resupply_28_Feb_2013_
WEBSITE.pdf (describing the function of financial reporting standards); see also
ISDA, IMPROVING REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY OF GLOBAL DERIVATIVES MARKETS:
KEY
PRINCIPLES
(2015),
http://www2.isda.org/attachment/NzI4NQ==/
Improving%20Regulatory%20Transparency%20FINAL.pdf.
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example) can at the same time be the subject of different
transnational private regimes, some focused on market design,
others on regulatory objectives.13 When they relate to the market
making, the standards define general rules for traders in order to
increase efficiency, reduce transaction costs and information
asymmetries, decrease risks of opportunistic behavior, and enhance
mutual trust both among traders and between traders and
consumers.14
When they concern regulation, they address
externalities, collective action problems and govern production or
access to global public goods.15
The fields of application go well beyond those traditionally
occupied by ‘jura mercatorum,’ including agriculture, human rights,
social and labor regulation, environment, and the more
conventional areas, such as finance, banking, professions, and trade,
including e-commerce.16 These private regimes are sector specific
but not self-contained.
They presuppose the existence of
international and domestic institutions that can support their

13 Interestingly, within the same industry we can find examples of TPR and
examples of custom in very close business communities. The World Diamond
Council with the System of Warranties represents one of the most well-known
forms of transnational private regulation along global supply chains. On the other
hand, communities of merchants like the Orthodox Jewish community in New York
constitutes one of the most studied phenomena of contemporary law merchants.
See Haufler, infra note 64; The Kimberly process certification scheme: An innovation
in Global governance and conflict prevention. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115,
149 (1992).
14
Daniel Spulber, Solving the Circular Conundrum: Communication and
Coordination in Internet Markets, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 537, 542 (2010) (“[F]irms acting
as intermediaries enhance transaction efficiency by pooling and diversifying risks,
lowering the costs of matching and searching, alleviating adverse selection,
mitigating moral hazard and opportunism, and supporting commitment through
delegation of authority.”).
15 See, e.g., Responsible Jewelry Council’s activities contribute to “supply chain
due diligence, legal compliance, anti-corruption, better environmental
management and reduction of impacts, safe and healthy workplace, rights and
benefits for workers and impacted stakeholders, community engagement and
development, Improved market access, consumer confidence.” RJC Theory of
Change, available at http://www.responsiblejewellery.com/files/4-RJC-Theory-ofChange.pdf. (Apr. 4, 2015).
16 I use the term jura mercatorum to capture the idea that they are multiple and
may differ depending on the type of commodity or services. Hence, I do not
subscribe to the idea that a single and common lex mercatoria is in place. I use the
term jus rather than lex to express the plurality of sources including private and
scholarly sources.
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functioning.17 They interact by both giving rise to conflicts or by
mutually reinforcing one another.18 The premise of the analysis that
follows is that of institutional complementarity rather than that of
separate and autonomous private orderings. The conceptual puzzle
concerns the definition of different types of complementarity
between private and public actors.19
Is the expansion of transnational private rule-making simply an
evolution of more conventional forms of custom and jus mercatorum
or does it depart from these forms of private rule-making? In the
latter case is there a common denominator of current forms of
transnational private rule-making? How does private rule-making
correlate with international and domestic public legal orders? Do
they constitute separate private orderings? Do they complement,
supplement or replace public legal orders? What is the combination
between legal and non-legal norms? Not only these questions have
theoretical relevance but they also shape important regulatory
policy choices at the international level concerning legitimacy,
compliance and enforcement of global private standards?20
Private regulatory regimes are often the outcome of an
interactive process with international and domestic public
organizations.21 Examples range from the collaboration between
IOSCO and ISDA on the regulation of over the counter (OTC)
derivative markets to collaboration between International Civil

17 See Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria. Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 458 (2007); see also, Kenneth Abbott, International
Organisations and International Regulatory Cooperation: Exploring the Links, in
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CO-OPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS:
THE CASES OF THE OECD AND THE IMO, 17 (2014). For a different perspective
claiming the independence and autonomy of lex mercatoria, see CLIVE SCHMITOFF,
COMMERCIAL LAW IN A CHANGING ECONOMIC CLIMATE (1977); Roy Goode, Rule,
Practice and Pragmatism in Transnational Commercial Law, 54 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 539,
546 (2005); ROY GOODE, THE HAMLYN LECTURES: COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE NEXT
MILLENNIUM 545 (1998).
18
See Robert Wai, The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law, 71 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 127 (2008); Burkard Eberlein et al., Transnational business
interaction: Conceptualization and framework for analysis, 8 REG. & GOV. 1 (2014).
19
As Avinash Dixit puts it, “the issue in the study of different governance
institutions is not the old-style contrast ‘market versus government.’ Rather it is the
interaction of the whole system of governance and transactions—what
combinations work well, under which conditions.” Avinash Dixit, Governance
Institutions and Economic Activity, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 5, 8 (2009).
20 See A Comparative Analysis, supra note 2 at 1.
21 See Jurgen Basedow, The State’s Private Law and the Economy- Commercial Law
as an Amalgam of Public and Private Rule-Making, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 703, 709 (2008).
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aviation organization (ICAO) and International Air Transport
Association (IATA) on civil aviation standards and compliance.22
The effectiveness of transnational private regulation, TPR, often
depends on the existence of good collaborative platforms among
domestic public regulators.23 If differences across jurisdictions are
significant, transnational private standards might not be able to
work even if they comply with the strictest domestic regulation. In
these situations, active cooperation with transnational regulatory
networks or international organizations is needed.
Many of the new private regimes complement those developed
by traders are conventionally labeled as lex mercatoria.24 For
example, rules concerning quality and prices are now
complemented by rules related to safety and environmental
protection.25 In areas such as banking and professional regulations,
there is some overlap, a significant transformation of conventional
private rule-making with an increasing regulatory component.26 In
other areas such as agriculture, good practices are incorporated into
codes of conduct that suppliers are required to comply with in order
to be certified.27 Other regimes, instead, cover new areas, pursuing
primarily a regulatory function, as in the case of environmental
protection and sustainability or internet governance and electronic
commerce. In some instances they address directly the regulated
entities, in other instances they constitute meta-rules directed at
private standard setters.28
22 See the comments and suggestions given by ISDA to IOSCO on cross-border
regulatory cooperation in derivatives, International Organization of Securities
Commissions [IOSCO], IOSCO Task Force on Cross-Border Regulation Consultation
Report, IOSCO Doc. CR09/2014 (2014). [hereinafter ISDA Comments].
23 Id. (suggesting principles IOSCO should adopt in order to promote cross
border regulatory cooperation. ISDA examines the toolkit of regulatory cooperation
proposed by IOSCO including national treatment, pass-porting, and
benchmarking, expressing a preference for the last).
24
See FRANCESCO GALGANO, LA GLOBALIZZAZIONE NELLO SPECCHIO DEL
DIRITTO, 43 (2005).
25 An example of these developments is the evolution of IATA in its standard
setting function.
26 GEOFFREY P. MILLER & FABRIZIO CAFAGGI, THE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION
OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (2013).
27 See, e.g., GLOBALG.A.P., GENERAL REGULATIONS (4th ed. 2012), http://www1.
globalgap.org/north-america/upload/Standards/IFA/v4_0-1/120206_gg_gr_
part_i_eng_v4_0-1.pdf (providing a mandatory set of regulations for members).
28
See, e.g., ISEAL Alliance, ISEAL CREDIBILITY PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES FOR
CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS SYSTEMS 4 (2013), http://
www.isealalliance.org/sites/default/files/Credibility%20Principles%20v1.0%20l
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Transnational private regulatory regimes –it is contended- do
not represent an alternative to jus mercatorum since their functional
focus is regulation driven by market failures rather than a set of
prescriptions related to individual transactions between market
participants. They integrate current public market regulation or
contribute to the creation of new markets through market design.29
The multifarious forms of transnational private rule-making
pose daunting questions concerning their origins, functions and
scope. This article addresses the different forms of transnational
private rule-making; it tries to examine their differences and the
consequences for their normative foundations and policy objectives.
After a brief historical overview, section I analyses transnational
private regulation (TPR), and section II examines usages, customs
and jura mercatorum. Section III presents a comparative assessment
between TPR and custom. Section IV defines an agenda for future
research and it is followed by the conclusion.

ow%20res.pdf (directing standard setters focusing on sustainability: “The ISEAL
Credibility Principles apply to all standards systems that focus on sustainability
performance and that incorporate a standard and a mechanism for assuring
compliance with that standard. . . . While these Principles offer a high level
overview, additional guidance and information about the interpretation and
application of these Principles is necessary and is captured in current and future
ISEAL Codes of Good Practice. The Credibility Principles are not intended to be
used in isolation as a normative evaluation tool. In applying these Principles,
stakeholders should consider how the Credibility Principles are embraced and
incorporated by a standards system, rather than attempting to determine whether
a standards system meets – or complies with – the Credibility Principles. Standards
systems may choose to combine these Principles in different ways, recognizing that
there are tensions and trade-offs between the various Principles, e.g. between the
rigor of a system and how accessible it is.”).
29 The distinction between market design and market regulation is not as clearcut as neoclassical economics claims it to be. Within the regulatory function of
private regimes I include rules concerning access and use of resources, both
material and immaterial, like environment and knowledge. Examples of private
standards related to market regulation include sustainability standards concerning
safety, labor and environmental regulation that go beyond international and
domestic law and ensure a higher degree of harmonization for MNCs operating
across multiple national jurisdictions.
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COMPLEMENTARITY IN TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE RULE-MAKING:
THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The existence of global private law making forms is not new. It
dates back to the middle ages, when merchants, artisans, and
farmers were collectively conferred regulatory and often normative
power by the public authorities to regulate business relationships
and commerce between domestic and foreign traders. Towns
conferred ‘çorporationes’ (guilds) power to regulate fairs and
commerce but also prices, qualities and the labor market.30 Crowns
conferred private entities power to regulate fairs and later to govern
colonies through ‘statuta’ and charters.31 At the same time,
merchants, artisans, and farmers created their own customary rules,
independently from any institutional support within guilds but also
independently from guilds.32 New contracts, like commenda and
compagnia, were created and standardized by merchants with the
crucial contribution of Italian notaries. Clearly, the absence of a
single authority, like the modern regulatory state, presents
difficulties for such historical comparison, as the concept of public
and private has transitioned and changed over time.33
The conceptual framework for inter-temporal comparison of
global private law making ought to take into account the changing
relationship between local and global legal systems. The role of
custom in medieval times must be framed within the relationship

30 Avner Greif et. al, Coordination Commitment, and Enforcement: the Case of the
Merchant Guild, 102 J. POL. ECON. 745, 749 (suggesting that merchant guilds
permitted foreign merchants to trade with the merchants of the town’s guild. “If
the purpose of the guilds was to create monopoly power for the merchants and to
increase their bargaining power with the rulers, why did powerful rulers during the
late medieval period cooperate with alien merchants to establish guilds in the first
place?”).
31 See, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion
of the Medieval ‘Law Merchant,’ 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685, 708 (comparing the
English crown in relation to St. Yves or the French in relation to the fair of
Champagne). [hereinafter St. Ives].
32
Michaels, supra 17 at, 447-68; Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of Non-State
Governance, 1 UTAH L. REV. 31 (2010).
33 See John F. Padgett, Early Capitalism and State Formation, in THE EMERGENCE
OF ORGANIZATIONS AND MARKETS, 115, 119 (2012) (suggesting a process of coevolution of markets and states. Even more dramatic changes have occurred in the
private sphere with the creation of corporate entities and the development of global
supply chains.); Henry Hansmann et. al, Law and Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1335 (2006).
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between jus commune and jura propria.34 The role of transnational
custom nowadays must instead be framed between public
international law and transnational private law.
The coexistence and interaction between jus commune and jura
propria characterized many legal orders in continental Europe.35
Private actors played a role in the development of both. The guild
system as it developed in medieval Italy and spread across Europe
in the twelfth, thirteen, and fourteen century represents a clear
illustration of private actors entrusted with regulatory, tax and
sanctioning power.36 In some instances there was even coincidence
between town governments and guilds; for example, the members
of the guilds were running town governments. In other instances
there was separation between the guilds and town governments,
albeit close collaboration between the two.37 Guilds regulated trade,
34 Jus commune is the medieval set of common rules applied in continental
Europe coming from Roman law (the Justinian Digest) and canon law; jura propria
are the local legal orders designed and administered by towns and cities. The two
were continuously interacting. See DAVID IBBETSON, COMMON LAW AND JUS
COMMUNE (2001); R.C. VAN CANAEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE
LAW (1992).
35
See PAOLO GROSSI, L’ORDINE GIURIDICO MEDIEVALE 223, 235 (2006) (“Jus
commune has a deeper penetration also in the most hostile and closed areas of jus
proprium: think to Venice that claims to be founded on the sea and for this reason
able to avoid any influence from mainland, and yet compelled to face the common
legal heritage.”) (translation by author).
36 See Sylvia L. Thrupp, The Gilds, in 3 ECONOMIC ORGANISATION AND POLICIES
IN THE MIDDLE AGES 230, 232 (“Town governments were then making increasingly
systematic use of gilds in general administrative work, treating the officers as quasipublic officials.”). The double identity of the guilds as both private and semi-public
is well captured by the description of the officers. Id. at 238 (“They were an organ
of the commune and they were a private group concerned with technical and trade
interests.”); see also Avner Greif, Institutional and Impersonal Exchange from Communal
to Individual Responsibility, 158 J. INST’L & THEORETICAL ECON. 168, 283 n.20 (2002)
(“[I]n many towns the mercantile and municipal organizations were identical, since
the merchant guild was the governing body of the borough.”)
37 The conventional examples are Florence, Bologna, and Milan. The first was
characterized by a high degree of coincidence between guilds and town
government, the latter by the separation. “According to Valsecchi, who dedicated
one of his early book to this subject, the process by which corporations would come
to conquer fully or partially the control over the City start swith the establishment
among them of a union or a confederation, but then would then progress along
three different stages. An example of of the first stage is the one of Milan, where
the confederation, founded in the area of St. Ambrose, failed in the process without
reaching the control of the City, nor exercising a strong political influence over it,
rather it aimed mainly at preventing the municipality to interfere in the fields that
corporations want strictly reserved to themselves. In the second group, the
proposed prototype is Bologna, where the corporations organized as a political and
military force are able to achieve control over the City. But they [ . . . ] can not
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prices, quality and, to a limited extent, even product safety.38 Guilds
enacted statuta that could be the expression of autonomous
normative power or the result of a ‘‘delegation” based on the
conferral of privileges.39 Their normative power was only limited
by jus commune.40
Guilds’ regulatory activities differ from
customary law, which developed without any formal ‘delegation’
by town governments or other ‘public’ authorities.41 Corporationes
(guilds) had both a ‘delegated’ and an autonomous power to
regulate trade and production.42
Medieval fairs and their regulation represent another example
of trade regulation by private actors entrusted with regulatory

achieve the result of having the City their own property, and can not prevent
foreign elements to be part of it, and therefore, in order to protect their position,
opposed to the old Comune maius their own vision, namely the City of the people
(comune del popolo). In the third group, finally, where Florence is the best known
example, the political ascension of the art guilds reaches its climax: after a path
fairly similar to Bologna’s one, the art guilds could, with the well-known law of
1282, to ensure the full control of the City, excluding any other constitutency.”
(translation by author) Gino Luzzatto, Corporazione, in ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO,
669 (1962).
38 See Thrupp, supra note 38, at 230-32.
39 Statuta were legal acts that had binding effects over members of guilds and
beyond. In particular, statute enacted by merchants regulated both internal
relationships among merchants and external relationships between merchants and
third parties.
40 “Mercatores et alii artificaes possunt facere inter se statuta et ista statute
sunt confirmata a jure communi et ideo non est necesse quod confirmetur per legem
municipalem . . . .” (Merchants and other artisans may adopt statuta and these act
are confirmed by jus commune, thus authorization by municipal law is not required
. . . .) But then he specified, “non possunt statuere quod sit natura iter et evidentem
iniustum . . . . Item non possunt statuere contra jus publicum totius civitatis.” (They
cannot regulate what should be the natural path nor what is unfair . . . . Similarly
they cannot regulate against the public law of the law of the city.) (translation by
author) n. 4, Lugduni, MDXLIV, c. 32 v. quoted in Vito Piergiovanni, Statuti Diritto
Comune e Processo Mercantile, in NORME, SCIENZA E PRATICA GIURIDICA TRA GENOVA
E L’OCCIDENTE MEDIEVALE E MODERNO 1105, 1108-09 nn.17 & 20 (2012).
41 They were both part of jus mercatorum. See FRANCESCO GALGANO, STORIA DEL
DIRITTO COMMERCIAL 38 (1976) (“Fonti del jus mercatorum erano gli statuti delle
corporazioni mercantili, le consuetudini mercantili, la giurisprudenza della curia
dei mercanti.”) (Sources of the law merchants are the acts of merchants guilds,
merchants customs, and jurisprudence of merchants courts) (translated by author).
42 See Piergiovanni, supra note 40, at 1108 n.15 (stating “Sul tema della potestà
condendi statuta Baldo, seguendo una tradizione dottrinale ormai consolidata, non
dubita che essa spetti alla corporazione senza necessita’ di una superiore
conferma.”) (on the subject of the regulatory power, Baldo following a well
established academic approach, does not doubt that it belongs to the guilds without
any confirmation by higher authorities) (translation by author).
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power.43 Unlike guilds, which enacted mainly local regulation, fairs
had a number of transnational regulatory aspects in relation to the
regulated entities.44 Their regulatory power was conferred by the
local public authority to the church or to other communities of
private actors.45 They not only regulated the transactions in the
trade, but also the liability and the sanctions for participants
committing violations.46 In some instances, the role of collective
responsibility in the trade became highly important, giving rise to a
system where the entire community was made responsible for the
default of an individual member.47 As for example, when a trader
delivered defective goods or did not pay the price and the
community was liable.48
The delegation of normative power to private actors has been
used repeatedly after the middle ages. The colonial expansion, for
example, was characterized by the use of corporate entities with

43
See O. Verlinden, Markets and Fairs, in THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY
OF EUROPE FROM THE DECLINE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE VOLUME 3: ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION AND POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE AGES 119–54, 133 (M.M. Postan, E.E.

Rich and E. Miller eds., 1963) (discussing the regulatory framework for Medieval
fairs).
44
See Id. at 132 (“ . . . at the end of the twelfth century and during the first half
of the thirteenth, the Champagne fairs were indeed the centre of the commercial
activity of the western world.“).
45 See Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the
Medieval ‘Law Merchant’, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685, 693–694 (“The king and abbot
had significant authority over the establishment of legal principles, the resolution
of disputes, and the enforcement of the fair court’s judgments.”).
46
See Verlinden, supra note 43 at 132 (noting that trade at fairs “must have
been subjected to a fairly strict control on the part of the royal agents who
superintended the customs store-rooms, which were “a kind of bonded
warehouse”).
47 This is the so-called reprisal: “ . . . the reprisal consisted of a sanction that
differed from the standard penalty, taking the form of an exclusion and interdiction
of all the defaulting debtor’s co-citizens from the fair.” Maura Fortunati, The Fairs
Between Lex Mercatoria and Ius Mercatorum, in FROM LEX MERCATORIA TO COMMERCIAL
LAW 143 (Vito Piergiovanni ed., 2005).
48
See Avner Greif, Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to
Individual Responsibility, 158 J. INST’L & THEORETICAL ECON., 168, 169–170 (2002)
(discussing the collective responsibility system and noting that an entire
community would be held liable for the default of an individual community
member); Lars Boerner & Albrecht Ritschl, Individual Enforcement of Collective
Liability in Premodern Europe: Comment, 158 J. INST’L & THEORETICAL ECON. 205, 205
(2002) (examining the institution of communal responsibility for the debts of
individual merchants across merchants’ associations and towns).
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governmental responsibilities, as the case of East and West Indian
companies show.49
Both historical and contemporary analysis demonstrates that
private legal regimes have never been fully independent from the
public sphere. Well before the formation of the nation states, public
authorities interacted with private actors in regulating markets,
trades, and what today is called welfare (health care, education,
public housing, and care for elderly the and disabled).50 Even after
the formation of the nation states, collaborative rule-making
between public and private actors has taken place. States have
promoted, steered, and orchestrated the activities of private actors.51
What constitutes the public sphere has undoubtedly changed
radically over time. The private sphere has also transformed over
the centuries. When examining the different forms of regulatory
power-sharing between the public and private spheres, one has to
be aware of the changing meanings of those terms, and in particular
the entry of new players in the last quarter of the 20th century. Yet
it is possible to identify some common threads for interpreting the
present with the awareness of the past.

49 See, ex plurimis, PHILIP STERN, THE COMPANY STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY
AND THE EARLY MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA 93 (2011). In

relation to the Dutch East India Company, see John Padgett, Country as Global
Market: Netherlands, Calvinism and the Joint Stock Company, in THE EMERGENCE OF
ORGANIZATIONS AND MARKETS 208, 226 (John F. Padgett & Walter W. Powell eds.,
2012).
50 See John R. Commons, American Shoemakers, 1648–1695: A Sketch of Industrial
Evolution, 24 Q. J. ECON., 39, 39 (1909) (demonstrating how the boot and shoe makers
responded to commercial and industrial changes by seeking refuge provided by
protective organizations).
51
See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International
Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration
Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 501 (2009) (suggesting that the
“Transnational New Governance” is well suited to international regulation because
it places fewer demands on intergovernmental organizations and states); Kenneth
W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards
Institutions in the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 44, 44–
45 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (discussing examples of the non-state
and public-private governance arrangements that began in the 1980s to implement
standards for global production in the areas of labor rights, human rights, and the
environment). For an historical perspective, see generally GOVERNMENT AND
MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION (Edward Ballesein & David Moss
eds., 2009).
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TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION

3.1. The Composition of the Private Sphere
Transnational private regulatory regimes are created by private
actors, in collaboration, rather than in competition with public
entities. Not only do they define standards to regulate firms’
behavior, but they also both define organizational fields and
partition the transnational regulatory space.52 Private standards
state more or less clearly their regulatory objectives and define, often
with some approximations, a metric to evaluate the effectiveness of
regulatory performances.53 They aim at changing the status quo and
improving the conditions of regulatory beneficiaries, including:
increasing consumer safety, decreasing environmental pollution,
enhancing human rights protection, granting smallholders access to
international markets and global supply chains, banning the
extraction of minerals in conflict zones, reducing corruption and
money laundering, promoting financial stability and mitigating
systemic financial risks, and ensuring access and use of internet.54
52
See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM.
SOC. REV. 147, 147 (1983) (discussing the isomorphic processes that lead sets of
organizations to become increasingly similar through rationalization and
bureaucratization once they have emerged as a field).
53
See Fabrizio Cafaggi & Andrea Renda, Strijbis Foundation Report,
Measuring the effectiveness of private regulatory organizations, (Oct. 3, 2014) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2508684 (stating the ways in which private standards
evaluate the effectiveness of regulatory performances).
54 In relation to the Internet, see, e.g., Section 2. Core Values, in BYLAWS FOR
INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS: A CALIFORNIA
NONPROFIT PUBLIC-BENEFIT CORPORATION, (as amended July 30, 2014), available at
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en.

“In performing its mission, the following core values should guide the
decisions and actions of ICANN:
1. Preserving and enhancing the operational stability, reliability, security,
and global interoperability of the Internet.
2. Respecting the creativity, innovation, and flow of information made
possible by the Internet by limiting ICANN's activities to those matters
within ICANN's mission requiring or significantly benefiting from global
coordination.
3. To the extent feasible and appropriate, delegating coordination
functions to or recognizing the policy role of other responsible entities that
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Who are the global private regulators? Enterprises and trade
associations, professionals, and civil society organizations (CSOs).
Industries are often complemented by civil society organizations
and non-governmental bodies. The single stakeholder model, with
a single constituency, typically an industry or a profession, has been
more recently complemented by the multi-stakeholder model where
industries, CSOs, and often governments convene, trying to
accommodate diverging objectives and conflicting interests.55 The
most common legal form is nonprofit.56
Who are the regulated? Ever more frequently, regulated entities
are the global chains rather than individual firms.57 There is a shift
reflect the interests of affected parties.
4. Seeking and supporting broad, informed participation reflecting the
functional, geographic, and cultural diversity of the Internet at all levels
of policy development and decision-making.
5. Where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to
promote and sustain a competitive environment.
6. Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain
names where practicable and beneficial in the public interest.
7. Employing open and transparent policy development mechanisms that
(i) promote well-informed decisions based on expert advice, and (ii)
ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy
development process.
8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and
objectively, with integrity and fairness.
9. Acting with a speed that is responsive to the needs of the Internet while,
as part of the decision-making process, obtaining informed input from
those entities most affected.
10. Remaining accountable to the Internet community through
mechanisms that enhance ICANN's effectiveness.
11. While remaining rooted in the private sector, recognizing that
governments and public authorities are responsible for public policy and
duly taking into account governments' or public authorities'
recommendations.”
55 See Lucy Koechlin & Richard Calland, Standard setting at the cutting edge: an
evidence-based typology for multi-stakeholder initiatives, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS
STANDARD SETTERS 84, 84-85 (Anne Peters et al. eds., 2009) (describing multistakeholder initiatives).
56
See Kevin E. Davis, Privatizing the adjudication of international commercial
disputes: the relevance of organizational form, in ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL
REGULATION: ENSURING COMPLIANCE IN A GLOBAL WORLD 211, 218 (Fabrizio Cafaggi
ed., 2011) (listing well-known international commercial arbitration institutions that
are organized as not-for-profit entities).
57 For example, the World Diamond Council System of Warranties requires “
. . . that all consignment of diamonds, whether rough, polished or set in jewellery
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from individual firms to groups of enterprises or to the entire supply
chain.58 This change is driven by the need for effective regulation
across national jurisdictional boundaries when chain leaders
outsource activities to suppliers located in different jurisdictions.
Private standards are addressed to the MNC and its whole supply
chain linked via contracts. Even when the regulated is only the
individual firm, the implementation of the standards often requires
taking into account interdependencies between firms along the
entire chain, and, as a result, regulatory networks are deployed. The
chain leader is made responsible to ensure compliance with the
standards by the suppliers in many due diligence regimes.59 Hence,
for example, if corruption takes place at the level of subcontracting
the main contractor can be held liable for failure to monitor and
ensure appropriate oversight or to set up the appropriate internal
management system. In the agri-food sector processors and/or
retailers may be held liable when pandemics arise because of
process standards violations by farmers, located upstream in the
supply chain not in privity of contract.
Compared to the conventional view that connects the private
production of rules to merchants and the industry, the
contemporary regimes are characterized by a much stronger
presence of CSOs.60 On one hand, transnational CSOs actively

be accompanied by a written warranty on all invoices through the supply chain.”
This approach is underlined in the OECD Guidelines: “In spite of the fragmented
production process in the supply chain, and independent from their position or
leverage over suppliers, companies are not insulated from the risk of contributing
or being associated with adverse impacts occurring at various points in the mineral
supply chain”. OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAINS OF
MINERALS FROM CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH RISK AREAS 16 (2d. ed. 2012)
[hereinafter OECD Due Diligence Guidance], available at http://www.oecd.
org/corporate/mne/mining.htm.
58 The trend is quite clear in certification regimes where chain of custody and
group certification are becoming the rule. See, for example, the Responsible Jewelry
Council Chain of Custody, the Fair Trade Chain of Custody, the PEFC Chain of
Custody Forest Based Products-Requirements, The Global Gap Chain of Custody
Standard, and the Marine Stewardship Council Chain of Custody Standard Default
Version.
59
See, e.g., OECD Due Diligence Guidance, supra note 57, at 20 (providing
guidance for a model supply chain policy for carrying out a responsible global
supply chain of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas).
60 See Anne Peters, Till Forster & Lucy Koechlin, Towards Non-State Actors as
Effective, Legitimate, and Accountable Standard-Setters, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS
STANDARD SETTERS 544, 552 (Peters et al. eds., 2009) (discussing “the shift towards
more synergetic relationships between public and private actors”).
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participate in regulatory processes led by public entities.61 On the
other hand, CSOs devise their own regimes, which sometimes
compete with but most of the time complement the public regimes.62
CSOs stimulate the birth of regimes, as in the case of conflict
minerals, forestry, and sustainability.63 Furthermore, they monitor
existing regimes and denounce violations and breaches, as do, for
example happens in the field of human rights with Amnesty
International, Global Witness, and Human Rights Watch.64 The
strategies may differ, but often CSOs campaign first, promoting
boycotts in market sensitive areas that induce multinationals to take
initiatives and define regulatory regimes to protect their reputation
and to preserve market values.65 They then seek to build coalitions
with industry and governments to establish new regulatory
regimes, in order to reduce and mitigate the consequences of the
human rights violations, environmental harms, and food safety
crises that sparked the boycotts.
The growing role of CSOs contributes to extend the
representation of interests affected by transnational private regimes,
thus increasing inclusiveness and participation in transnational

61 See Sabino Cassese, The Global polity: Global Dimensions of Polity and the
Rule of Law, (2012) [hereinafter Cassese, Global Polity].
62
See David Vogel, Taming Globalization? Civil Regulation and Corporate
Capitalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, 472, 472
(David Coen et al. eds., 2010) (defining civil regulation and describing the actors
involved); A Comparative Analysis, supra note 2, at 31.
63 In relation to certification, see Tim Bartley & Shawna Smith, Communities of
practice as cause and consequence of transnational governance: the evolution of social and
environmental certification, in TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES: SHAPING GLOBAL
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE, 347, 350 (Marie-Laure Djelic & Sigrid Quack eds., 2015)
(discussing social and environmental certification associations and other
organizations that are involved in the activity but are not dedicated certification
associations); Graeme Auld, CONSTRUCTING PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: THE RISE AND
EVOLUTION OF FOREST, COFFEE, AND FISHERIES CERTIFICATION (2014).
64 In relation to conflict minerals and the role of CSOs, see Virginia Haufler,
Transnational Business Governance and the Management of Natural Resources, in
COMPARATIVE RESEARCH IN LAW & POLITICAL ECONOMY SERIES 16 (2012), available at
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/24 (explaining the differences
between supply chain regimes in diamonds and other metals, specifically tin,
tantalum, and gold).
65 See Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Can non-state global governance be
legitimate? An analytical framework, in REGULATION & GOVERNANCE 1.4 355 (2007); T.
Bartley, Certification as a mode of regulation, HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 441 ( D. Levi Faure ed., 2011); Axel Marx, Global Governance and the
Certification Revolution: Types, Trends, and Challenges, HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 604 (D. Levi Faure ed., 2011); Auld, supra note 63.
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regulation.66
Consumers, investors, workers, human rights
stakeholders, and organizations have created transnational
communities.67 They started developing their own standards and
managed to “persuade” multinationals to adopt these standards.
CSOs also participate in different capacities to set standards, led by
industries. Such expansion increases the heterogeneity of interests
in transnational regulatory processes, changing the identity and
features of private regulation.
3.2. Conflicts of Interests and Organizational Responses
The transnational private sphere is heterogeneous, replete of
conflicts about both objectives and instruments.68 This diversity is
reflected in the nature of transnational communities that have
emerged and are involved in regulatory processes.69 Within private
regulation, different views may exist about trade-offs between
regulatory objectives and instruments’ choices.70 First, the content of
conflicts will be examined followed by an analysis of institutional
responses.

66
See Cassese, GLOBAL POLITY, supra note 61; Richard Stewart, Remedying
Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, Participation and
Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 214 (2014) (highlighting the wide array of
organizations that participate in transnational regulation).
67 See Marie-Laure Djelic & Sigrid Quack, Transnational communities and their
impact on the governance of business and economic activity, in TRANSNATIONAL
COMMUNITIES SHAPING GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE, 377, 382–83 (Marie-Laure
Djelic & Sigrid Quack eds., 2015) (describing the creation of transnational
communities).
68
For information related to conflicts within the private sphere, see Fabrizio
Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation? (European University
Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Working Paper No. 53,
2010) at 31.
69
See Tim Bartley & Shawna N. Smith, Communities of practice as cause and
consequence of transnational governance: the evolution of social and environmental
certification, in TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES SHAPING GLOBAL ECONOMIC
GOVERNANCE 347, 350 (Marie-Laure Djelic & Sigrid Quack eds., 2010) (establishing
that, unlike national communities, transnational communities represent a much
wider variety of interests and objectives).
70 See Julia Black, Legitimacy, accountability and polycentric regulation: dilemmas,
trilemmas and organizational response, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS
241, 255 (Anne Peters, Lucy Koechlin, Till Forster & Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel eds.,
2009) (discussing the different views that exist as to the trade-offs between
regulatory objectives and the choice of instrument).
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Private regimes address conflicts within industry, both within
CSOs and between industry and CSOs. Conflicts are both allocative
and distributive.71 Allocative conflicts concern the definition of the
level of the optimal standard, in particular its degree of strictness or
laxness. Distributive conflicts concern the allocation of compliance
costs and the benefits related to the implementation of private
standards.
More broadly, they concern the distribution of
regulatory power within the private sphere and between private
and public actors.72
Interests’ heterogeneity is reflected into both the composition of
the communities of the regulated and that of the beneficiaries.
Communities of regulated entities are formally defined by legal
instruments that regulate access and exit to the regime. The primary
tools are membership or individual contracts between regulator and
the regulated. The community of the regulated in membership
based organizations has legal power to participate in the regulatory
process and to define the agenda of the organization and its
regulatory objectives.
Private standards are always stricter than public ones but how
much stricter should they be? Who has to pay the additional costs of
stricter standards along global value chains? Is the distribution of
costs explicitly regulated by the standard itself?
Very rarely the standards explicitly determine costs’ allocation
among regulated entities. Private regimes differ in their emphasis
on fairness regarding costs’ distribution. Some regimes specifically

71 In particular, there are conflicting views between north and south, emerging
and mature economies, and even between newly-emerged economies, require
balancing and the creation of multilevel structures able to accommodate such
heterogeneity. Private standards may increase compliance costs in order to reduce
externalities. The distribution of compliance costs among regulated entities located
along global supply chains represents a major source of conflicts in transnational
private regimes.
72 See Tim Büthe & Walter Mattli, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION
OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 441–43
(2011) (discussing the
internationalization and privatization of rulemaking); Fabrizio Cafaggi &
Katharina Pistor, Regulatory Capabilities: A Normative Framework for Assessing the
Distributional Effects of Regulation 1 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 13-354, 2013) (developing the normative concept of
“regulatory capabilities,” asserting that no entity should be subjected to a
regulatory scheme without some freedom to choose). See also Richard B. Stewart,
Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, Participation and
Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 213 (2014) [hereinafter Stewart Accountability]
(discussing how to hold authorities in international regulatory schemes
accountable).
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determine the amount of premiums that retailers are required to pay
suppliers when they comply.73 Others leave parties the task of
negotiating cost distribution on the basis of general principles, and
some regimes do not even regulate the matter. If the private
regulator does not explicitly regulate cost distribution among
regulated entities, private parties handle the issue contractually.
The buyer defines the premium to be paid if the supplier complies
with the standard. Generally, there is not a premium and no cost
reimbursement without compliance.
Distributional conflicts are not only about pecuniary costs, as
they also concern objectives and trade-offs. Take the relationship
between global private standards and innovation transfers. Many
private regimes regulate the transfer of innovation related to safety
and environmental protection from MNCs to Small and Medium
Sized Enterprises (“SMEs”). Should innovation be transferred on
the basis of private regulation? Should the transfer be simply
instrumental in order to pursue the regulatory objectives, or should
it also stimulate the growth of SMEs in the Global South? Should,
for example, patents be freely accessible within supply chains?
Should suppliers pay fees to the patent’s owner? Should fees be
correlated to compliance with private standards so that monitoring
costs will decrease and overall efficiency increase?
Different views about ranking objectives and distributing costs
and benefits exist not only within industry, but also in the world of
non-governmental organizations. Conflicts among CSOs concern
the definition of objectives and how to prioritize them. In the past,
private regimes would conflict since some would target
environmental protection while others would prioritize safety even
at the expense of environment. Protection of consumer safety at the
expenses of the environment would generally benefit Northern
consumers at the expense of Southern producers. But even with
environmental organizations, food safety organizations, and
certifications regimes in particular, differences concerning
regulatory objectives and priorities are and today were in the past
73
Premiums incorporate the additional costs of compliance and part of the
benefits derived therefrom. See, for example, the structure of premiums designed
by Fair Trade labeling organization (“FLO”), where the premium associated with
the compliance with requirements is defined in FLO STANDARDS UNIT, Standard
Operating Procedure: Development of Fair Trade Minimum Prices and Premiums 9 (2014),
available
at
http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/
2009/standards/documents/2014-03-13_SOP_Development_of_Fairtrade_
Minimum_Prices_and_Premiums.pdf.
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even more significant.74 Things are partly changing. There is a
growing trend towards the integration of standards within
sustainability, attempting to reach a compromise between
conflicting objectives, especially in multi-stakeholder organizations.
However, some divergences still persist.
A variety of institutional responses to conflicting views and
objectives has been provided. The first response to conflicts is
provided by governance models.75 There is an increasing use of
74 See Christine Overdevest, Comparing forest certification schemes: the case of
ratcheting standards in the forest sector, 8 SOCIO- ECONOMIC REVIEW 47, 2010; Graeme
Auld, CONSTRUCTING PRIVATE GOVERNANCE, 5 (2014).
75 In many instances, CSO-driven regimes take multi-stakeholder forms in order to
accommodate diverging views and objectives, as for example in food safety, where
they include farmers, processors, retailers, and environmental and consumer
protection organizations. See, for example, the Roundtable of Sustainable Biofuels,
where there are seven chambers representing different interests. According to
Article 4 of the Charter the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials Association,
there are seven chambers:
1. Biomass producers (e.g. farmers, plantation managers and other
feedstock growers);
2. Industrial biomaterial/bioenergy producers;
3. Retailers/blenders, transportation industry, users of biomaterials and
banks/investors;
4. Rights-based NGOs (including land, water, human, and labor rights)
and trade unions;
5. Rural development, food security, smallholder farmers, indigenous
people, and community-based civil society organizations;
6. Environment, or conservation organizations and climate change, or
policy organizations;
7. Intergovernmental
organizations
(IGOs),
governments,
research/academic institutions, standard-setters, specialist advisory
agencies, certification agencies, and consultancy organizations, as well as
any other applicants for membership who do not fulfil the characteristics
of any other Chamber.
Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials Association, Articles of Association,
Version 23 September 2014, Art. 4 (last accessed Jan. 2, 2015), available at
www.rsb.org.
See Round Table on Responsible Soy Association, Statutes, Art. 4 (accessed June
28, 2015), available at http://www.responsiblesoy.org/documentos/ statutesbylaws/?lang=en, where there are three constituencies:

“1. Producers,
2. Industry,
Trade
(excluding producers, including

as crushers, traders,
financial institutions),

food

3. Civil society organizations.”
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multi-stakeholder regulatory models, which includes both a simple
and a complex version. In the simple version, the organization
opens the membership to different constituencies.76 In some cases,
the regulatory model prioritizes constituencies by using different
membership statuses. The main constituency is granted full
membership, while other constituencies are given the status of
associate members—or that of observers. The complex model is
composed of different chambers, or pillars, within the general
assembly. Each constituency is represented in a chamber, and the
chambers appoint members of the board.77 The multi-chamber
models represent a more sophisticated approach used when there is

See Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil, Background, (last accessed Jan. 15,
2015), available at http://www.sustainablepalmoil.org/standards-certfication/
certification-schemes/the-roundtable-on-sustainable-palm-oil-rspo/,where there
are seven sectors:
“1. Banks and investors
2. Consumer goods manufacturers
3. Environmental or nature conservation organizations (NGOs)
4. Oil Palm growers
5. Palm Oil processors and Traders
6. Retailers
7. Social or Development Organizations (NGOs).”
In membership-based regimes, as is the case for associations, both access
and exit are regulated by the law of the association. Membership is the tool that
permits a potentially regulated entity to participate to the regulatory process and
implies the undertaking of obligations related to the regime. Members of IATA
have to be airlines and commit to comply with IATA standards related to safety
and the circulation of dangerous goods. . . Members of FSC . . . members of ISDA,
members of GFSI.
77
This model is used by Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”), where the
General Assembly is composed of three membership Chambers, and is the highest
decision-making body in FSC. The Chambers are divided on the basis of three
different constituencies, Environmental, Social, and Economic, and are further split
into sub-chambers countries from the Global North and Global South. Each subchamber then elects two members of the Board of Directors, which has a total of
twelve members. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, Governance, https://ic.fsc.org/
governance.14.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). An alternative model is that
deployed by the International Code of Conduct for Private Service Providers
Association, where article 3, which concerns membership, states: “Membership in
the Association shall be divided into three membership categories reflecting
stakeholder pillars: the Private Security Companies and Private security Service
Providers pillar (hereinafter PSC pillar), the civil society organization (CSO) pillar
and the government pillar.” International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Service
Providers,
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICoC_Articles_of_
Association.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
76
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double heterogeneity: within and between constituencies. For
example, in the Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”) model, there
are three chambers: economic, social and environmental.78 Each
chamber includes multiple organizations whose interests might not
be perfectly aligned. The individual chamber attempts to achieve a
solution, which can then be negotiated with the other chambers in
the general assembly.
The second institutional response to the heterogeneity of
interests is related to the changes of the regulatory process
concerning participation and consultation.79 Many transnational
private regulators have codified their standard setting procedures,
which require consultations at different stages of the drafting
process.80 In some instances, standard setting procedures have been
adopted by private meta-regulators and then implemented by
individual regulators in their own procedures.81 In other instances,
they are designed by individual regulators. Participation in the
regulatory process by regulated entities can be accomplished in
different ways, either individually or collectively.82
Many
transnational private regulators create technical committees whose
components are appointed on the basis of expertise and
78
Forest Stewardship Counsel, Governance, https://us.fsc.org/governance.
181.htm (last visited June 28, 2015).
79 See Olga Malets & Sigrid Quack, Projecting the local into the global: trajectories
of participation in transnational standard setting, in ORGANIZATIONS AND MANAGERIAL
IDEAS: GLOBAL THEMES AND LOCAL VARIATIONS, 325, 325–338 (Drori, Hollerer ,
Walgenbach, et al. eds., 2013).
80
ISEAL ALLIANCE, ISEAL CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE: SETTING SOCIAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS (2014) 6; see also IASB AND IFRS INTERPRETATIONS
COMMITTEE, DUE PROCESS HANDBOOK (2013), http://www.ifrs.org/DPOC/
Documents/2013/Due_Process_Handbook_Resupply_28_Feb_2013_WEBSITE.
pdf; ISO/IEC GUIDE 59, CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE FOR STANDARDIZATION (1994),
https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:guide:59:ed-1:v1:en; UTZ CERTIFIED,
CODE DEVELOPMENT PROCEDURE FOR A UTZ CERTIFIED PRODUCT CODE (2011),
https://utzcertified.org/attachments/article/1987/Code%20Development%20Pr
ocedure%20UTZ%20CERTIFIED.pdf;
EUROPEAN
ADVERTISING
STANDARDS
ALLIANCE,
DRAFT
EASA
BEST
PRACTICE
RECOMMENDATION
(2010),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/contributions/
organisations/epc_annex2b_en.pdf;
FAIRTRADE
INTERNATIONAL,
Standard
Operating Procedure Development of Fairtrade Standards (2012), http://www.
fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/standards/documents/201202-07_SOP_Development_Fairtrade_ Standards.pdf.
81
On meta private regulation, see Fabrizio Cafaggi, Regulating Private
Regulators, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (S. Cassese
ed.), forthcoming, 2015 (on file with the author).
82 See Cassese, GLOBAL POLITY, supra note 61.
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representation of interests.83 They often represent interests and
constituencies outside those who have been granted membership.
In technical committees, consensus is the general rule; therefore
participation influences the final outcome of the decision making
process.84 The alternative or complementary method to ensure
inclusiveness is granting consultations at every relevant drafting
stage. The outcomes of consultations have to be taken into account
and reasons have to be given when recommendations are rejected.
Governance models and the integration of standards constitute
complementary responses to the heterogeneity of various interests
in transnational private regulation.
4.

THE PROCEDURAL FEATURES OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE
REGULATION

4.1. Standard Setting.
TPRs are rather formalized; the regimes adopt written standards
according to predefined procedures subject to periodical revision.
This is a significant difference compared to customary law.85 They
act as private legislatures and increasingly define rules on how the
regime should be governed, including standard setting, monitoring,
and implementing enforcement procedures.86 At times these
procedures are defined by the charters and bylaws of the
organization, but most times they are separate standards whose
development is characterized by rules open to consultation with
external stakeholders. Such a divide marks the separation between
the governance of the organization and governance of the
See for example GFSI, ISEAL, IFRS.
See Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance:
Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness, 108:2 AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 214, 235
(2014) (distinguishing between decisional and non-decisional participation
depending on how the right to participate can influence the final decision and in
particular the content of the standard).
85 See infra.
86
See Colin Scott, Standard-setting in Regulatory Regimes, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON REGULATION, 104, 104 (Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin Lodge
eds., 2010) (elaborating on the standards within regulatory regimes and “the
challenges of a accountability associated with the emergence of a highly diffuse
‘industry’ for regulatory standard setting”).
83
84
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regulatory process. The two are connected, albeit not overlapping.87
The development of a separate body of rules concerning the
participation in the process underlines the distinction from pure
self-regulatory regimes where openness and inclusiveness have not
been the primary concerns.
Private standards are voluntary, and regulatory regimes
frequently use market mechanisms to promote their diffusion and
to ensure effective implementation.88 They are generally legally
binding, although their effectiveness is additionally ensured
through non-legal mechanisms.89 Codes of conduct, regulatory
contracts, rule-books and agreements represent the primary
instruments to design and to implement standards. Auditing and
reporting constitute the most significant techniques to assess
compliance;90 they ensure the flow of information from the
organization towards the community of the regulated, the potential
beneficiaries, and the regulator.91 The paradigmatic example is
certification where different schemes have emerged, driven by CSOs
or by industry, and more recently by multiple stakeholders,
including national governments.92
It is worth examining some of the procedural features of
transnational regulation in more detail, beginning from the process
87 See generally Fabrizio Cafaggi, A Comparative Analysis of Transnational Private
Regulation: Legitimacy, Quality, Effectiveness and Enforcement (Hague Inst. for the
Internationalisation of Law) (Preliminary Draft June, 2014) (on file with author)
(discussing the relationship between organizational governance and regulatory
processes).
88 See Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 65 at 354.
89 See Tim Buthe & Walter Mattli, International Standards and Standard-setting
Bodies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 440, 441 – 43 (David
Coen, et. al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Buthe & Mattli] (identifying five reasons for
compliance with “voluntary” standards: superior solutions to technical problems,
network externalities, information asymmetries, social pressure or political legal
incentives, legal sanctions).
90 See generally Neil Gunningham, Enforcement and Compliance Strategies, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 120 (Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin
Lodge eds., 2010) (examining how to create an enforcement strategy that achieves
effective and efficient policy outcomes while also maintaining community
confidence).
91
See ISEAL Code of Practice 6.4.2, 6.4.3, 6.4.4 ICOC articles of association
article 12, available at www.isealalliance.org (assuring compliance with social and
environmental standards).
92
Certification is highly relevant in some sectors, such as environment,
product safety, while it plays only a minor role in other areas like finance. T. Bartley,
Certification as a Mode of Regulation, Handbook on the Politics of Regulation 441
(D. Levi Faure ed. 2011).
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of codification concerning standard setting.93 In the past, many
private regulators did not have rules defining standard setting
procedures. Charters and bylaws regulated their activity without
any reference to the interests of stakeholders lacking membership.
Private regulators would operate with ad hoc procedures to enact
codes of conduct or guidelines related to the activities of their
regulated entities. Such systems have been subject to serious
criticisms by external stakeholders and even by those members not
involved in the process.94 States and international organizations
recommended the definition of clear rules concerning the regulatory
process for the purpose of integrating them into their legal orders.95
More recently, private regulators have come to adopt standard
setting procedures to which different bodies involved in the
regulatory activity must comply with, including dispute
settlement.96 The objective is to make the drafting process
transparent, subject to review and contestation in order to increase
its legitimacy (both input and output). The effects of increasing
proceduralization of the regulatory process are manifold. Clearly
they enhance legitimacy and transparency, but at the same time
increase both costs and time. Standard setting rules include periodic
revision and integration. The obligation to revise codes and
standards after a relatively short period of time ensures the pace of
regulatory innovation without crystallizing the standards.
In some instances, the standard setting procedures deployed by
individual regulators follow templates produced by meta private
regulators.97 A case in point is that of the members of International
social and environmental accreditation and labeling (ISEAL)
alliance. ISEAL is a non-profit company incorporated in the UK and
encompasses a number of organizations in the field of

See Buthe & Mattli, supra note 89, at 441.
See Stewart Accountability, supra note 72, at 234 (contending that the
accountability deficit of global regimes can be corrected by reforming some of the
current accountability mechanisms).
95 This has often been the case for the European Union that has stimulated a
more accountable definition of the regulatory process.
96 See, e.g., ISO-IEC Directives part 2, 2014 available at www.iso.org. Due
process handbook of IASB, available at www.ifrs.org., EASA Recommendation on
code drafting and consultation available at www.EASA.org., ISEAL standard setting
code available at www.isealalliance.org.
97 See, e.g., ISO Guides for Standardization Drafted in Compliance with the
WTO Code of Practice ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004 and ISO/IEC Guide 59:1994.
93
94
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sustainability.98 It produces meta-rules to be applied to the
members.99 ISEAL has published three codes, one related to
standard setting, one on impact (monitoring) and one on assurance
(compliance and enforcement).100 Compliance with the codes is
mandatory for full members. The standard setting codes defines
procedures that members have to follow when enacting their own
codes.101 These rules concern (1) the criteria for participation in the
process (mapping stakeholders, selecting the relevant actors
according to a balance of different interests),102 (2) the drafting
criteria, (3) the process of consultation that has to be repeated after
each stage, and (4) the process of revision that has to take place
periodically.103
Both in the case of meta-regulation and that of individual
regulators, one challenge is to accommodate heterogeneity in the
community of regulated entities.
Private regulators aim at
regulating thousands or even millions of firms across the globe.
Differences related to size, managerial and financial capabilities,
and business cultures may be dramatic. A regulatory strategy that
fits for every possible regulated entity does not exist. There is need
to differentiate according to departure points and developmental

ISEAL Alliance, www.isealalliance.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
Meta-rules are framing principles that individual regulators implement in
their own regulatory instruments. See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Transnational Private
Regulation: Regulating Private Regulators, cit. fn. 81, p. 18-19.
100 ISEAL Alliance, www.isealalliance.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
101 See ISEAL Alliance, Standard Development Point 5.1 Terms of Reference,
www.isealalliance.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (stating that standard
developments have to follow the terms of reference which must include: a
justification for the new standard, a clear definition of the objectives the standard
intends achieving, “an assessment of risks in implementing the standard and how
to mitigate for these, including identification of factors that could have a negative
impact on the ability of the standard to achieve its objectives, the identification of
unintended consequences, and possible corrective actions to address these
consequences.”)
102 See ISEAL Alliance, Standard Development Point 5.5.1 Terms of Reference,
www.isealalliance.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (requiring that “standard setting
organizations shall ensure that participation in standard consultation is open to all
interested parties and that participation and decision making reflects a balance of
interests among interested parties in the subject matter and in the geographic scope
in which the standard applies.”)
103 See, e.g., UTZ Certified Code Development Procedure 2.0 September 2014,
www.utzcertified.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (enacting compliance with ISEAL
code of good practice for setting social and environmental standards).
98
99
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capabilities of each (cluster of) regulated entities.104 The regulatory
approach is changing: many organizations now define timelines
that permit firms with different sizes and capabilities to reach the
stage of full compliance over time through a process of “continuous
improvement.”105
4.2. Review and Enforcement Mechanisms
Enforcement is a key pillar of every regulatory system. In TPR
enforcement mechanisms operate to ensure compliance with the
standards and solve disputes between regulator and regulated,
between regulated, and between regulated and third parties.106
Sometimes enforcement is partly decentered and the regulator
imposes the adoption of grievance mechanisms on each regulated
entity to solve disputes with third parties.107
Some regimes are still limited to standard setting and do not
provide any dispute resolution mechanisms, relying on domestic
courts or on generic enforcement private systems such as
arbitration.108 Dispute resolution bodies in transnational private

104 See, e.g., UTZ Core Code of Conduct 1.0, 2014, www.utzcertified.org (last
accessed Jan. 15, 2015) (highlighting the 4 year used by UTZ certified in their Core
Code of Conduct distinguishing between mandatory and additional control points.
The total amount is always 120 but the first year the ratio is 60/60, the second is
87/33, the third is 103/17, the fourth is 113/7).
105
Typically this is true for SMEs, compared to large enterprises when the
same standard applies, but the time to achieve full compliance differs. In other
contexts, regulators have designed different standards introducing distinctions
among regulated entities.
106 See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Enforcing Transnational Private Regulation: Models
and Patterns, in Fabrizzio Cafaggi (ed.) Enforcement of Transnational Regulation,
Ensuring Compliance in a Global World, 2012, 75 ff. 99 [hereinafter Enforcing
Transnational Private Regulation].
107 In the field of private securities, see art. 13 International Code of Conduct for
Private Security Providers, ICOC, and in the field of data protection, binding
corporate rules usually include legal enforceability of rules by the so-called
controller. See Art. 29 Data Protection WP, Explanatory Document on the Processor
Binding Corporate Rules, 10 (2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2013/wp204_en.pdf.
108
2013 ISDA Arbitration Guide, available at www.isda.org (explaining the
paradigmatic case of ISDA where the master agreement (section 13 b) indicated as
default clause the jurisdiction of English Courts. In 2013 a policy change occurred
and ISDA suggested the introduction of arbitration agreements).
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regimes are more common in membership-based organizations,
including trading platforms.109
Recently, dispute settlement bodies have been created
separately from the standard setters to preserve their independence,
impartiality, and autonomy and to reduce conflicts of interest.110
Their degree of independence and compliance with due process
varies across fields.111 The private enforcer might be a unit of the
regulatory body or have independent legal personality but its
activity should not be subject to the control of the standard setter.
Parallel to the creation of independent enforcers has been the
codification of rules. Individual regulators have expressly codified
principles about regulatory enforcement; accordingly enforcement
procedures have to be accessible and fair, the enforcer has to be
independent and impartial, and must provide injured parties with
effective remedies.112 Compared to the contemporary ‘merchant
courts,’ a much higher degree of proceduralization and a lower
degree of discretion is warranted in this type of private
adjudication.113

109
The creation of an enforcement body should not be interpreted as it has
been the case for lex mercatoria as an attempt to insulate these regimes from the
control of domestic courts that continue to play a significant role.
110
The most well-known example is the TAS (Sport Arbitral Tribunal)
reformed to comply with a judgment of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court that
required separation and independence from the standard setting body (Swiss
Federal Tribunal, Gundel v. Fédération Equestre International, 15 March 1993, BGE
119 II271). See L. Casini, The Making of a Lex Sportive by the Court of Arbitration
for Sport, Ger. L. J. 1317 ff. at 1322 (2011). In the field of advertising see EASA Best
practice recommendation on jury composition available at www.easa.org., applied
to national SROs regulating advertising. See P. Verbruggen, Enforcing
Transnational Private Regulation, EE, 2014.
111 See generally Fabrizio Cafaggi, Enforcing Transnational Private Regulation,
supra note 106 at 77.
112
See, e.g., art. 13.1 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service
Providers, ICOC. The importance of a fair and impartial grievance mechanisms is
also emphasized by the ‘Ruggie’ principles concerning CSR. See United Nations
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, Principle 31 (2011) available at www.un.org (casting the criteria for
effective non-judicial grievance mechanisms).
113
Even if the enforcement body is composed by experts with specific
knowledge of the sector, impartiality and due process have become necessary
conditions for legitimacy.
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The third party enforcer just described has not entirely replaced
other models, in particular that of first party enforcement.114 In
many instances the scheme owner maintains the right to directly
administer sanctions when regulated entities violate the rules. This
is the case in electronic trade platforms, in certification schemes, in
several roundtables to name a few.115 In the latter examples the
standard setter and the enforcer coincide, and there is no
independence.
Proceduralization of enforcement includes the definition of a
sanctioning system. Enforcement by private regulators is based on
a tripartite set of sanctions: those stemming from contract law, those
based on organizational law, and those grounded on reputation.
Legal sanctions, often defined by the codes of conduct, are generally
combined with extra-legal sanctions.116 Legal sanctions are often
based on membership and strongly related to reputational effects in
the market place.117 Clearly conventional sanctions for breach of
contract are rarely used. Purely reputational mechanisms on the
other hand would not suffice to protect the interests of those who
suffer harms from regulated entities’ violations. Much more
common is the combined use of corrective measures and the power
of exclusion on the basis of an escalating mechanism.118

114 See Dixit, supra note 21, at 10 (using Avinash Dixit taxonomy, one should
conclude that first, second and third party enforcement institutions co-exist in
transnational private regulation).
115
See GLOBALG.A.P., GENERAL REGULATIONS: PART I; GENERAL RULES, art. 6.6
(Part I 4.0-1, 2012) (art. 8 and 15) (concerning the power of GLOBALG.A.P. to sanction
certification bodies), Roundtable for responsible soy where the executive board has the
power to admit and exclude members (art. 8 and 15).
116 The creation of blacklists that forbids engaging in trading relationships or
expulsion from the regime may have severe economic repercussions, being often
much more effective than damages.
117
Enforcement mechanisms vary depending on whether the regulator is
membership based. In this instance, the regulator has a right to exclude or suspend
membership depending on the seriousness of the violation. Often loosing
membership can have blaming and shaming effects much stronger than common
contractual sanctions.
118 On the use of right of exclusion as a governance mechanism, see Henry E.
Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31
No. S2 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002). On the use of complementary enforcement
mechanisms, see Gillian K. Hadfield, Contract Law is Not Enough: The Many Legal
Institutions That Support Contractual Commitments, in HANDBOOK OF NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (Claude Menard and Mary Shirley, eds., Kluwer 2004);
Avinash K. Dixit, LAWLESNESS AND ECONOMICS (Princeton University Press, 2004).
ALTERNATIVE MODES OF GOVERNANCE, 97 ff.
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A clear illustration of an institutionalized community, using
both reputational and legal sanctions, is provided by some
contemporary e-commerce platforms where the reputational
sanctions are determined by peers on the basis of the platform
regulation.119 In addition, the platform owner can use legal
sanctions primarily directed at preventing wrongful conduct by
traders that may result in the suspension or termination of an
individual account.120

119 For instance, in the case of eBay, after each transaction on the auction
platform, parties are asked to leave an evaluation of the negotiation partner, namely
a Feedback: buyers can leave a positive, negative, or a neutral rating, plus a short
comment, whereas sellers can leave a positive rating and a short comment. The
ratings provided by each user build up the so-called Feedback scores, where
members receive one additional point for each positive rating, no points for each
neutral rating, and reduce one point for each negative rating. This allows the other
users to verify the trustworthiness of the buyer or seller within the platform. Since
20th August 2014, the eBay system added a new measure for sellers’ evaluation:
the transaction defect rate. This provides information regarding the seller’s
successful transactions that have one or more transaction-related defects. Ebay sets
a minimum standard for this rate: sellers can have up to a maximum 5% of
transactions with one or more transaction defects over the most recent evaluation
period. A maximum 2% will allow a seller to qualify as an eBay ‘Top Rated Seller.’
It is not clear what exactly happens when this requirement is not met. The website
only affirms that “eBay regularly offers coaching and training to sellers in order to
help them be more successful. Sellers who fall below standard can expect to receive
clear notification of next steps and actions. Consequences of falling below the
minimum performance standards can include lowered search standing, limits to
further selling, and in some cases a permanent loss of selling privileges.” 2014
Spring Seller Update: Updates to Seller Standards Designed to Reward Great Service with
More
Sales,
EBAY.COM,
http://pages.ebay.com/sellerinformation/news/
springupdate2014/sellerstandards.html#highlights (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). In
cases of negotiation problems, eBay’s internal negotiation platform can resolve
problems: “If the buyer and seller can’t come to an agreement, eBay may decide the
case. eBay may issue a refund, reverse a sale, or require the buyer to pay for an
item.” Contacting Customer Service, eBay.com, http://pages.ebay.com.sg/eBP/
(last visited Jan. 21, 2015). Finally, if suspicious activity is reported, the eBay Trust
and Safety team investigates the situation. If a member violates a policy, the process
is warning, limitation and then suspension of the account privileges. Knowing the
Rules for Sellers, eBay, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/policies.html (last visited
Jan. 21, 2015).
120
See, e.g., eBay User Agreement, eBay.com, http://pages.ebay.com/help/
policies/user-agreement.html, http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/roleof-eBay.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (”If we believe you are abusing eBay in any
way, we may, in our sole discretion and without limiting other remedies, limit,
suspend, or terminate your user account(s) and access to our Services, delay or
remove hosted content, remove any special status associated with your account(s),
remove and demote listings, reduce or eliminate any discounts, and take technical
and/or legal steps to prevent you from using our Services..”).
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The boundaries between compliance monitoring and
enforcement are not always clear-cut in transnational private
regulation.121 On the one hand, the notion of enforcement is broader
than that adopted in the public sphere, including different
sanctioning systems that deploy legal and non-legal sanctions. On
the other hand, the distinction between ex ante oversight and ex post
punishment has blurred. In some instances a complex multi-tool
strategy has been designed. For example, in the Articles of the
Association of Private Services Companies International Code of
Conduct (ICOC), three systems must simultaneously be in place:
certification (art. 10), reporting, monitoring, and assessing the
company’s performance (art. 11), and the complaints process (art.
12).122 In other instances, auditing and reporting are the primary
mechanisms to ensure compliance.123
Auditing and reporting constitute only part of the wide array of
instruments deployed by private regulators.124 Self-assessment tools
are now provided to individual firms in order to allow them to
assess and report on their regulatory performance.125 The outcomes
of self-assessment can be subject to evaluation by committees and be
discussed by the community of regulated and affected stakeholders.
Different forms of peer reviews are deployed to promote mutual
learning between regulated entities participating in the same
regime. They often take the network form in order to ensure
adequate interactions among participants.126
Conflicts concern not only the application but also the validity
of rules. Many regimes define internal review procedures where
121 Especially in certification regimes, the power to monitor compliance with
certification schemes and the power to issue sanctions for noncompliance are not
well differentiated. The certification body has to monitor compliance and can
suspend or terminate certification as a punishment for noncompliance. See, e.g.,
GLOBALG.A.P., supra note 115, at art. 6.
122
See Swiss Confederation, International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Providers, ICOC (Nov. 9, 2010).
123 This is the approach taken by ISEAL in its assurance code. ISEAL Alliance,
Assuring Compliance with Social and Environmental Standards: Code of Good
Practice (2012), available at www.isealalliance.org.
124 See, e.g., Stewart Accountability, supra note 94, at 252 (listing transparency,
peer reputational influences and incentives, and competition as some of the more
broadly defined methods of accountability).
125
See CAFAGGI & RENDA, supra note 9, at 99; Stewart Accountability, supra
note 94, at 211.
126
See Timothy D. Lytton & Lesley K. McAllister, Oversight in Private Food
Safety Auditing: Addressing Auditors Conflict of Interest, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 289, 330-331
(2014) (describing the network structure of institutional oversight).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

CAFAGGI

908

9/24/2015 4:04 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 36:4

affected stakeholders may seek standards’ review before specialized
committees or independent bodies.127 These mechanisms are
primarily directed toward parties who are not members and have
not been able to actively participate in standard setting activities.
Internal review is separated from complaints handling and often
dealt with by a different committee. Review is also performed by
domestic courts that contribute to regulatory innovation.128 The use
of domestic courts to adjudicate disputes related to the
implementation of transnational regulation may come at a cost.
Decentralized review procedures may cause inconsistencies when
different laws are applicable to the same transnational regime.129
The link between internal and external review process is still rather
weak. Enforcement and review mechanisms have become more
relevant in global private regulatory regimes. They provide a
centralized mechanism deploying a wide menu of sanctions that
complement decentralized enforcement by domestic courts and
arbitrators.
4.3. Separation of Functions in the Regulatory Process
The evolution of the last twenty years suggests that
transnational private governance has moved toward separation of
functions. The private regulatory process is now structured
similarly to the conventional public process, separating the various
127 See, e.g., Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, art.
IV, ICANN (July 30, 2014), https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws2012-02-25-en?routing_type=path (describing three alternative mechanisms [board
reconsideration committee, independent review panel, ICANN ombudsman] in the
field of internet domains); Swiss Confederation, International Code of Conduct for
Private Security Service Provers’ Association: Articles of Association, art. 13.2.3, ICoC,
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICoC_Articles_of_Association.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 26, 2015) (describing procedures in the field of private security
companies, where the Secretariat reviews complaints regarding grievance
procedures).
128
Two examples are provided by the English and New York Courts in the
adaptation of the ISDA Master agreement and the role of the Federal Swiss
Supreme Tribunal in relation to International Olympic committee. INTERNATIONAL
SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT (2002),
available at www.isda.orghttp://www.isda.org/publications/isdamasteragrmnt.
aspx#ma.
129 See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Enforcing Transnational Private Regulation: Models and
Patterns, in ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION: ENSURING COMPLIANCE
IN A GLOBAL WORLD (Edward Elgar ed., 2012) at 92.
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functions: standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement. In the
simpler version, this separation has occurred within the same
organization by creating differentiated committees to ensure that no
conflicts of interest arise. In more complex architectures, separation
of functions has spurred the creation of independent units,
sometimes with their own legal personality. This development,
driven by the need for higher accountability, has departed from the
more conventional private model of the merchant courts where the
same community, often the same individuals, set the rules and solve
conflicts concerning their application.
Multi-stakeholder
organizations tend to have a higher degree of functional separation
between standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement.
5.

REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS

A third distinct feature of TPR is represented by the specificity
of regulatory instruments. TPRs define voluntary standards to be
applied by regulated entities, individually or collectively, for the
benefit of third parties, e.g. the regulatory beneficiaries (consumers,
investors, human rights holders, environmental groups). These
standards are collected or codified in codes, rulebooks, guidelines,
or principles.130
Standards can define how regulated entities should ensure a
certain level of product safety or prohibit social practices that imply
the use of child labor, slavery, and discrimination. They may either
(1) proscribe the standards and let regulated entities choose the
implementation instruments (output standards), or (2) suggest or
impose not only the tool (the standard contract form) firms have to
deploy, but also the governance requirements necessary for good
implementation (input standards).131 In this matter there is a wide
variety of standards ranging from general principles to highly
detailed and specific rules.
130
See, e.g., Equator Principles, supra note 8; International Bar Association,
Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession (2011); ISEAL Credibility Principles,
supra note 31; World Diamond Council, System of Warranties (2014),
https://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/resources/documents/Syst
em%20of%20Warranties%20WDC%202014.pdf; International Code of Conduct for
Private Security Providers, supra at note 128; Unaccompanied Standards, IFRS (Jan. 1,
2014), http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/Pages/IFRS.aspx#1 (accounting standards).
131 For example they can impose the adoption of HACCP for product safety
and a specific safety management scheme to implement it.
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Contracts are also an important element in the regulatory toolkit.
Standard contracts and standard terms constitute conventional
instruments to regulate cross-border exchanges whose scope and
functions have recently been broadened to incorporate regulatory
objectives.132 They are deployed (1) to regulate the relationship
between regulator and regulated, (2) to implement standards in the
relationship between regulated and third parties (sale or
distribution contracts), and (3) to monitor standards’ compliance
(certification contract).
Regulatory contracts are used to create and regulate new
markets. In addition to the traditional activities related to the
collection of standard forms and term of the International Chamber
of commerce (ICC), new markets have been created by private
regulators ranging from electronic trading platforms to financial
over the counter (OTC) infrastructures. New technologies and
financial innovation have spurred new trading platforms with
participants coming from different jurisdictions.133 While creating
new markets or implementing regulatory policies, private
regulators design master agreements, framework contracts, and
standard contract forms that participants are recommended to use
when engaging in trade.134 For example, the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA) master agreement represents a
powerful regulatory tool to regulate derivatives’ transactions.135 The
ISDA master agreement is incorporated in the individual contracts,
which cover a number of transactions. Other examples of
contractual standardization directed at marked design concern data
protection, e-commerce, and product certification.136
132
See Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Regulatory Functions of Transnational Contracts:
New Architecture, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1557 (2013) [hereinafter New Architecture]
(exploring the increasing interaction between transnational contracting,
transnational regulation, and certification).
133 These markets are primarily regulated by private actors with some degree
of public intervention by domestic legislation and by trans-governmental networks.
134 Competition and antitrust authorities have banned the practice of private
regulators imposing contractual forms or terms on regimes’ participants. In Europe
this prohibition has been applied directly to banking contracts.
135
The ISDA Master Agreement (MA) specifies that the MA and the
confirmation statements are part of the same agreement and reflects the interests of
all ISDA members, ensuring the diffusion of the regulatory instrument and
consequently the development of the market. INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND
DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT (2002) available at
http://www.isda.org/publications/isdamasteragrmnt.aspx#ma.
136 On the ISDA Master agreement, see DAVID A. SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL
DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES
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Regulating markets often implies the definition of
boilerplates.137 Contracts’ standardization performs important
regulatory functions, particularly when there is strong
interdependencies among the transactions taking place within a
single market: e.g. prices and quantities of each transaction
influence the prices and quantities of other transactions, contractual
termination may affect prices of other contracts and induce other
defaults. Contract standardization also plays a strategic function in
generating network externalities.138 New participants have an
incentive to adopt the ISDA master agreement if that is already used
by the majority of traders in that market.
The regulatory function of contracts has in turn had an impact
on the sanctioning system. Compliance with private standards,
incorporated in the commercial contract, is ensured by a double
system of sanctions.139 Contractual sanctions are sought by the
buyer against the seller, while regulatory sanctions are administered
by the private regulator to the party responsible for compliance. The
latter may refer to whichever contractual party subscribes to the
regulatory regime.

163 (Wiley, 2010); Joanne Braithwaite, Standard Form Contracts as Transnational Law:
Evidence From the Derivatives Markets, 75(5) M.L.R. 779 (2012); J. Biggins and C. Scott,
Public-Private Relations in a Transnational Private Regulatory Regime: ISDA, the State
and OTC Derivatives Market Reform (2012) 13 European Business Organization Law
Review 307, p. 324; P. Saguato, in THE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 32 (2013). In the field of certification licensing, standard
contract forms regulating the relationship between the accrediting body and the
certifier and the certifier and the certified are a constant feature of each regime. See
GLOBALG.A.P., supra note 121; IFOAM. In the field of ecommerce, all the
electronic platforms define general principles in codes or principles and then issue
standard contracts forms that trader have to use.
137
See S. CHOI AND MITU GULATI, Contract as Statute in O. BEN- SHAHAR,
BOILERPLATE 145, 149 (2006). See Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute,
in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET CONTRACTS 145, 149 (Omri BenShahar, ed., 2007).
138 See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract As Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1129 (2005-2006); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation
of Corporate Contracting (Or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997)
(analyzing how externalities influence standardization, customization, and
innovation in corporate contracts). See Mitu Gulati & Stephen J. Choi, Contract As
Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (2006); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Standardization and Innovation of Corporate Contracting (Or “The Economics of
Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997) (analyzing how externalities influence
standardization, customization, and innovation in corporate contracts).
139 See New Architecture, supra note 1372, at 1600.
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Implementation of private standards can involve groups of
regulated entities. In these instances, the regulated entities are
recommended to use multiparty and regulatory contracts to
establish a network that has to implement regulatory requirements.
Such networks can be (1) vertical, including parties along the global
supply chain aimed at implementing safety, environmental, or
social policies, or (2) horizontal among firms in different supply
chains located in the same geographic location.140 The use of
contracts imposes monitoring costs on the parties along the chain to
evaluate compliance and react in case of non-compliance through
innovative sanctioning regimes.
To ensure compliance, many regulatory instruments use market
driven tools, including both prices and sanctions. They reward
compliance via market prices and punish violations by using
reputational and community sanctions, in addition to the more
conventional contractual and associational sanctions.141 Possibly the
most interesting developments concern compliance instruments; for
example, how regulated entities’ compliance is ensured using both
hierarchical and peer monitoring.142
Regulatory instruments do not focus only on standard setting
and implementation. Compliance monitoring has stimulated the
development of many innovative regulatory instruments.
Furthermore, it refers to the regulator and to those that have to
comply. Private standards concern also reporting and monitoring

140
Horizontal networks can be created to access capital (multiparty loans),
technologies (patent pools), and knowledge (multiparty contracts to transfer knowhow).
141 Dixit, supra note 118, at 97.
142
See NEIL GUNNINGHAM, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES 120
(Oxford Handbook of Regulation, 2010). See generally CHRISTINE PARKER & VIBEKE
LEHMANN NIELSEN, EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE:
BUSINESS RESPONSES TO
REGULATION (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011); FABRIZIO
CAFAGGI, THE ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION 108 (Edward Elgar ed.,
2012); PAUL VERBRUGGEN, ENFORCING TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISING AND FOOD SAFETY (Edward Elgar ed., 2014);
GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
(Wolters Kluwer 1st ed., 2014). See NEIL GUNNINGHAM, Enforcement and Compliance
Strategies, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 120 (Robert Baldwin et al. eds.,
2010). See generally CHRISTINE PARKER & VIBEKE LEHMANN NIELSEN, EXPLAINING
COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION (Edward Elgar ed., 2012);
FABRIZIO CAFAGGI, ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION 108 (Edward
Elgar ed., 2012); PAUL VERBRUGGEN, ENFORCING TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE
REGULATION (Edward Elgar ed., 2014); GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF
GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE (2014).
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compliance by regulated entities.143 Firms are required to issue
financial and non-financial reporting where they document their
degree of compliance with human rights, social, and environmental
policies.144 Due diligence requirements associated with compliance
often translates into changes concerning both the internal
governance of the corporation and that of the supply chain.145 Selfassessment is the first - yet not the exclusive - instrument to monitor
regulatory performance. Private regulators use ex officio power to
inspect and monitor regulated entities compliance, in addition they
may deploy third party monitoring by delegating this function to
‘independent’ private actors.146 Monitoring instruments increase
accountability both towards the regulated along with the
beneficiaries of the regulatory process while also providing
information about overall effectiveness.
6.

USAGES, CUSTOM, AND JURA MERCATORUM

Conventionally, the new lex mercatoria has been described as a
body of privately set rules produced by a community of traders
whose legitimacy is provided by the community itself.147 It is a

143
See, e.g., GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
GUIDELINES (2013), https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRIG4Part1-Reporting-Principles-and-Standard-Disclosures.pdf. (last visited Apr. 3,
2015).
144 ICOC Articles of Association, supra note 91, at art. 12.
145
See generally The Kimberley Process, Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme, available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document
(last visited Apr. 3, 2015); FAO-OECD Guidance for Responsible Agricultural
Supply Chains, Draft for Comment, 2015, available at http://mneguidelines.
oecd.org/FAO-OECD-guidance-responsible-agricutural-supply-chains.pdf (last
visited Apr. 3, 2015); International Fund for Agricultural Development, Procedures
for Financing from the Grants Programme, available at http://www.ifad.org/
gbdocs/eb/102/e/EB-2011-102-R-28.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
146 See generally Fabrizio Cafaggi & Andrea Renda, Measuring the Effectiveness
of Private Regulatory Organizations, 82 STRIJBIS FOUND. REP. (2014), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2508684.
147
ROY GOODE ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW 38 (Oxford Univ.
Press, 2007) (“[L]ex mercatoria . . . consists of the unwritten customs and practices
of merchants so far as satisfying externally set criteria for validation. This definition
excludes written codification of customs and practice . . . . [L]ex mercatoria is thus
best seen as being true to its origins the product of spontaneous activity on the part
of merchants.”).
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contested concept.148 Among the most debated issues are the selfcontained nature of lex mercatoria and its independence from state
laws. Recently, both the assumption of statelessness and that of
centralization of rulemaking and uniformity have been successfully
challenged.149 Both historians and lawyers have shown that lex
mercatoria emerges out of an institutional framework where
adjudication plays a paramount role.150 Moreover, merchant rules
have been for the most part local and often conflicting, rather than
uniform and universal.151
The concept of custom (consuetudo) is at the same time broader
and narrower than jus mercatorum.152 Through custom, social

148
See Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives—and Faces—of Lex Mercatoria:
History as Genealogy in International Business Law, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 169
(2008) (detailing the analysis of lex mercatoria’s rival accounts).
149
Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 447–68 (2007); Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of Non-State
Governance, 1 UTAH L. REV. 31, 31–45 (2010); THE AMES FOUNDATION, LEX
MERCATORIA AND LEGAL PLURALISM: A LATE THIRTEENTH-CENTURY TREATISE AND ITS
AFTERLIFE (Mary Elizabeth Basil et al. eds., 1998) available at
http://amesfoundation.law.harvard.edu/lm.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015); J.
Donahue, ‘Benvenuto Stracca’s De mercatura: Was There a lex mercatoria in Sixteenth
Century Italy?’, in FROM LEX MERCATORIA TO COMMERCIAL LAW, COMPARATIVE STUDIES
IN CONTINENTAL AND ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 24, 69–120 Ralf Michaels,
The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447,
447–68 (2007); Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of Non-State Governance, 1 UTAH L. REV. 31,
31–45 (2010); Mary E. Basile et. al., LEX MERCATORIA AND LEGAL PLURALISM: A LATE
THIRTEENTH-CENTURY TREATISE AND ITS AFTERLIFE (1998); Charles Donahue,
‘Benvenuto Stracca’s De Mercatura: Was There a Lex mercatoria in Sixteenth Century
Italy?’, in FROM LEX MERCATORIA TO COMMERCIAL LAW, COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN
CONTINENTAL AND ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 24, 69–120 (Vito Piergiovanni
ed., 2005) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE STUDIES].
150 The role of adjudication is very relevant to identifying the existence of a
custom and determining its content and effects. While it is universally recognized
that adjudication by courts and arbitrators is relevant, different views exist on the
effects of judicial “recognition” of custom. Some believe that it is a precondition for
making the custom binding; others hold the view that it has only a declaratory
function. See generally Roy Goode, Usage and its Reception in Transnational
Commercial Law, 46 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 1, 7–18 (1997); ALBRECHT CORDES, The Search
for Medieval Lex Mercatoria, 5 OXFORD U. COMP. L F., 64 (2003), http://ouclf.iuscomp.
org/articles/cordes.shtml.
151 See Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV.
1153, 1153 (2012) [hereinafter The Myth] (providing an account of commonly
conflicting rules).
152 See J. Gilissen, Consuetudine, in DIGESTO, DISC. PRIVATISTICHE 9 (UTET, 1988)
9 [hereinafter Gilissen, Consuetudine]; NORBERTO BOBBIO, LA CONSUETUDINE COME
FATTO NORMATIVO (pincite) (1942) (parenthetical); Norberto Bobbio, Consuetudine
(teoria generale), in 9 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 426 (Antonino Giuffre ed., 1961). For
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practices in commercial and social relationships become legally
binding.153 Customary rules have contributed to the creation of new
markets or to their globalization, as for example the financial
instruments like bills of exchange and bills of lading introduced by
Italian bankers and merchants in the fifteenth century.154 Custom is
broader because it is not limited to merchants and to contracts and
exchanges; it applies to other fields of private law, from property
and intellectual property to torts and restitution.155 It concerns
weights, measures, and other performance features (e.g. time and
place) related to exchanges.156 Custom tends to be associated with
specific transactions and markets. It “regulates” the exploitation of
resources - the limits posed in the interest of community - to the use
of collective resources when related to ownership.157
Jus mercatorum is broader than custom since it encompasses both
statuta (general regulations concerning merchants and the
relationships between merchants and third parties), consuetudo
(custom), and the decisions by merchant courts.158
Historically, custom was the primary source of legal regulation
of commercial relationships in Europe until the French revolution
and the Code de commerce of 1807, where primacy of legislation
determined the decline of custom. However, custom never
disappeared after the codification process started.159 Even after the
Ordonnance de commerce was in 1673 enacted by Colbert, the role
of “coutumes” in French commercial law remained very
significant.160 A different path was followed in English common
a historical perspective, see generally the essays in COMPARATIVE STUDIES, supra note
149.
153 Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 4
(4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1999).
154 See Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 105 (1991) (explaining
the evolution across institutions in early modern Europe).
155
See Geoffrey Hodgson, On the Institutional Foundations of Law: The
Insufficiency of Custom and Private Ordering, 43 J. of Econ. Issues, 143 (2009).
156 Id.
157 See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990).
158 See FRANCESCO GALGANO, STORIA DEL DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 38 (1976).
159 David Ibbetson, Custom in Medieval Law, in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW
153-155 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James B. Murphy eds., Cambridge U. Press
2007). See also R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAW
(1-15) (D.E.L. Johnson trans., 1988).
160 Vito Piergiovanni, Diritto Commerciale nel Diritto Medievale e Moderno, 4
DIGESTO 333, 343 (1989). Vito Piergiovanni, Diritto Commerciale nel Diritto Medievale
e Moderno, in DIGESTO, 333, 343 (1989).
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law, where the origins of common laws are often grounded on
custom and integration rather than separation as the distinctive
feature of the relationship between law and custom.161 At common
law, custom and laws are seen more as complements than
competing sources.162
Custom develops out of usages that reflect patterns of behavior
by members of a business community.163 Unlike “mos” (habit) which
represents factual pattern of behavior, consuetudo (custom)
constitutes a normative practice.164
In medieval times, (business) communities were closed and
access was regulated.165 Nowadays for the purpose of custom, the
community does not have to define strict membership
requirements. The process through which usages and customs
become binding on the relevant community may differ, depending
on whether it is self-defined by the community or regulated by the
public authority via legislation or adjudication.
When the community of traders defines the process through
which rules become binding, they refer to internal rules of their
community. These rules range from social norms to highly
formalized instruments.166 The public law perspective differs when
it determines the criteria for custom to be legally binding. In
contemporary legal systems, custom or ‘consuetudo’ is part of legal
sources of domestic and international regimes.167 Parties can make
specific references to custom in their contract; custom can prevail
over default rules whereas it cannot conflict with mandatory rules.168
See H. PATRICK GLENN, ON COMMON LAWS 16–20 (2006).
Ibbetson, supra note 159, at (153).
163
The distinction between usages and custom goes back to the school of
Orleans and the contribution by Jacques de Revigny,
164
See Ibbetson, supra note 159, at 156 (stating that in relation to medieval
times, “habit represented a factual regularity while custom was normative.“).
165
See Piergiovanni, supra note 160, at 338 (“La cittadinanza è requisito
normalmente richiesto per appartenere alla corporazione, oltre all’esercizio
dell’attivita’ mercantile ed alla buona fama: l’entrata viene poi sancita dal
giuramento di accettazione delle norme sociali e dal pagamento di una tassa”).
166 Paul R. Milgrom, et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: the Law
Merchant, Private Judges, and Champaign Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990).
167 See, e.g., U.N. Commission on the International Trade Law, Digest of Case
Law on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, art. 9(2), U.N.
DOC. A/CN.9/SER.C/DIGEST/CISG/9 (June 8, 2004) [hereinafter “CISG Art. 9”];
at the domestic level, art. 12 preleggi of the Italian Civil code.
168 Williston & Lord, supra note 153, § 34 (“At common law, the requisites for
incorporating a custom or usage, [1] in order that it could be considered as entering
into a contract and forming a part of it,[2] are that it must be ancient or long161
162
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When parties are silent, the applicability of transnational customs is
determined according to the law of the contract.
According to the conventional legal definition, custom
constitutes a form of private production of rules that become
binding when the community tacitly consents.169 The common
features of custom are generally associated with the repetition over
time of behavior by the majority of the community.170 Thus the two
requirements are repetition over time of a specific behavior and
opinio juris sive necessitatis.171 The former concerns the conduct of the
community’s members, the latter represents the (tacit) consent of the
relevant community to that behavior.172 The significance of the
belief that a practice exists (opinio juris) has been relaxed in some
areas, where simple presumed knowledge of the custom’s existence
is considered the necessary and sufficient precondition to become
legally binding.173
How is the scope of custom’s application defined? What are the
business or social community’ boundaries to which it applies? In
customary law the relevant community is composed by merchants
or traders, in agricultural law by farmers, in the professional world
by lawyers, doctors, engineers, accountants and so on. Unlike TPR,
where the regulator often represents different and competing
interests including those of stakeholders who are the primary
beneficiaries of the standards (consumers, investors, and human
rights holders), in custom, the community is composed by those
who apply the rules. Interests of the affected stakeholders outside
of the business community are not relevant to transform the social
established,[3] certain,[4] continuous,[5] uniform,[6] general,[7] notorious,[8]
reasonable,[9] and not in contravention of law.[10] Furthermore, parties acting
within the scope of the usage's operation must acquiesce in it.[11]”).
169
For the different perspectives with a focus on law and economics, see
CUSTOMARY LAW AND ECONOMICS (Lisa Bernstein & Francesco Parisi, eds. 2013).
170
See BARTOLUS OF SASSOFERRATO, IN PRIMUM DIGESTI VETERIS PARTIS
COMMENTARIA, Fol. 191 (1425).
171 See Rodolfo Sacco, Consuetudine; Gilissen, Consuetudine, supra note 152, at
para. 5 (distinguishing between an objective element [repetition over time] and a
subjective element [belief that the rule is binding]).
172 The consensual dimension has always been relevant to make it legally
binding. In relation to then medieval times it has been claimed, “Just as the basis of
legislation was the will of the prince, so the basis of custom was the will of people.”
Ibbetson, supra note 159, at 175.
173
See, e.g., International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT), Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2010); CISG Art. 9,
supra note 167.
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practice into a legally binding set of rules. Custom can produce
externalities that are not internalized through the prescriptions of
procedural requirements like those described in relation to TPR.
The boundaries of what constitutes a relevant community, the
amount of time and the frequency of repetition may vary from
custom to custom. The boundaries of the relevant community and
of the scope of majoritarian consent are often left undetermined.
Communities for whom custom is binding may be personal or
territorial.
Consequently, customs may be personal and
independent of a specific territory or territorial when associated
with an administrative jurisdiction.174 Hence, there are customs
developed by merchants, bankers, and farmers, and customs
developed in London, Florence, Paris, Genoa, Antwerpen, Lubeck,
and so on. Nowadays, the primacy of legislation has reinforced the
distinction between personal and territorial scope: the personal
dimension of customs versus the territorial dominance of
legislation; hence communities producing transnational customs are
primarily functional rather than territorial entities.175 This a
common feature of transnational private rule-making.
Each community may adopt a different metric to define the
existence and the content of custom. In agriculture, for example, the
distinction between production, transformation and distribution
practices is based on how different communities define their own
practices. The former community is composed by farmers, the
second by the processors of agricultural commodities, the third by
retailers. However, even when global institutions like commodity
exchanges harmonize customary rules, local differences persist. The
local and transnational dimensions affect the relevance of the
community through which the opinio juris ac necessitatis is formed
and has an impact on judicial recognition. Domestic courts may use
different parameters to evaluate whether a custom exists depending
on its local or international scope and the boundaries of the
community.
What characterizes custom is its evolutionary pattern:
incremental rather than radical and instantaneous, retrospective
rather than prospective. It starts with usages that can be repeat
conducts by a number of the community’s members. Custom

See Gilissen, Consuetudine, supra note 152, at 9 para. 6.
Clearly a different account concerns local customs whose territorial
features still dominate.
174
175
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becomes binding on the entire community only when the majority
of its members, at least tacitly, consent.176
The binding nature of custom should not be confused with its
(non-existing) mandatory character. Even when custom is legally
binding, parties have the opportunity to opt out.177
To emerge custom presupposes some institutional
(pre)conditions.
Key determinants are certainly interests’
homogeneity and the presence of repeat players.178 (1) Legally
binding customs are not likely to arise when the community is
characterized by the presence of heterogeneous and conflicting
interests. Rather, this is the domain of regulation, either public or
private. In the middle ages when private actors (for example,
merchants in corporationes) were conferred the power to regulate
their activities, the decision between enacting ‘statuta’ or developing
customs was related, among other factors, to the degree of conflict
of interest among the members of the communities. When conflicts
were significant and the emergence of a common and shared rule
was not likely to happen, they would enact a ‘statutum’. When
conflicts were limited, private actors would instead let the rules
develop on the basis of practices construed with the aid of
professionals (consilia). Interests’ homogeneity does not imply lack
of conflict. Conflicts in developing a custom are admissible, but
within a community whose interests are generally aligned.179 This
feature represents a major difference from transnational private
regulation and especially from the more recent multistakeholder
forms that include representatives of industries, governments and
CSOs.180 (2) Consistent with interests’ homogeneity of custom is the
repeat player nature of the community’s members.181 Given that

See Gilissen, Consuetudine, supra note 152, at 9.
The opt out of custom strategy is much harder in fields of property and
torts, where parties should explicitly regulate the matter in order to make custom
inapplicable. This is in contrast with the contracts field, where parties can state the
inapplicability of custom to their agreement. It is commonly accepted that parties
can opt out of custom by making an explicit reference to the inapplicability of
custom to their contractual relationship.
178 See Clayton P. Gillette, The Law Merchant in the Modern Age: Institutional
Design and International Usages Under the CISG, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 157, 162 (2004).
179
Examples of these conflicts range from those concerning time of delivery
and time of payment to those related to the definition of merchandise.
180 See Cafaggi, supra note 2.
181 See Gillette, Institutional Design, supra note 178, at 163.
176
177
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custom arises out of usages that materialize in repeat conducts, such
repetition is likely to occur when players are the same.
(3) A third institutional precondition is custom’s observability.182
For a custom to emerge, the pattern of behavior and the tacit consent
have to be observable by the members of the community.
Observability is translated into the legal requirement that the
custom is known or should have been known to the parties in order
to become binding. Modern technologies make behavior among
distant players observable. Hence physical proximity and size of
the community are not any longer institutional preconditions of the
emergence of customary rules.
Custom may develop in
communities where players are numerous and far away.
Observability marks another significant difference from private
regulation: since parties have to opt in to private regulation for it
to be binding, in TPR knowledge is actual and observability is
unnecessary.
How are customs enforced? When customs become binding,
they can be enforced before a court, but the most powerful
instrument is conventionally considered extralegal enforcement by
the community.183 The community, once the custom has been
recognized as binding, deploys extralegal sanctions to punish
violations.184 A custom’s modes of enforcement depend on the (1)
degree of the community’s institutionalization, (2) existence of a
third party’s enforcer, and (3) relationship between individual and
collective responsibility.185
There are different degrees of community’s institutionalization
within which custom develops; sanctioning regimes change
accordingly. When the community is not institutionalized, the
sanctioning system is primarily, if not exclusively, reputational.186
The members who do not comply with customary rules can be
excluded from the trade via refusal to deal. However, the
Id. at 164.
See Vito Piergiovanni, Courts and Commercial Law at the Beginning of the
Modern Age, in THE COURTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL LAW (Vito
Piergiovanni, ed., 1987); Piergiovanni, Diritto Commerciale, supra note 165. But see
Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The
Maghribi Traders Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 531 (1993).
184
See Avinish K. Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of
Governance, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 5, 7 (2009).
185 See Avner Greif, Impersonal Exchange Without Impartial Law: The Community
Responsibility System, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 109, 110 (2004).
186 See Milgrom, North & Weingast, supra note 166.
182
183
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effectiveness of the administered sanction depends on the size and
cohesiveness of the community. Reputational sanctions work where
there is cohesion of the objectives of the rules and where the
violation by the individual participant produces negative effects on
the entire group. Mutual trust supports the use of reputational
sanctions. When the community is institutionalized, enforcing a
mechanism with a predefined procedural structure can be set up. A
system of adjudication is generally composed of laypeople (not
professional judges) experts in the field. In relation to the
enforcement of custom, the sanctioning menu is much richer than
legal ones, and the sanctions tend to correlate to the gravity of the
violations and its recurrence (e.g., whether it has occurred in the
past, between the same parties). The higher the degree of the
community’s institutionalization, the closer the enforcement
mechanisms to those adopted in TPR where increasingly
independent ‘dispute resolution bodies’ administer sanctions and
monitor their execution.
The above description assumes a highly decentralized form of
rule-making where the usage becomes binding on the basis of its
spreading across the community that provides tacit consent.
However, in many instances private institutions have codified
customs.187 Codifying institutions contribute to reduce uncertainty
by collecting usages and making them publicly available. The
paradigmatic contemporary example is offered by the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), but many specialized institutions
collect usages in relation to particular areas of finance, commerce
and trading or in agriculture and in professions. Clearly the very
definition of custom may change if instead of a spontaneous process
of incremental consolidation, specific institutions perform the task
of identifying and collecting the usages to ‘transform’ them into a
legally binding custom. Codification of customs is performed by
different institutions: the individual global supply chain, the
industry, and the market. In many instances, these codifications are
not themselves binding. They are purely informative. They become
binding when trading platforms make compliance an entry

187 See, e.g., Chicago Mercantile Exchange; Chicago Climate Exchange available
at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@iodcms/documents/
file/rercmecbot072613.pdf.
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requirement or when chain leaders require compliance with best
practices as a prerequisite for accessing the chain.188
Does the process of customs’ codification change the nature of
custom as a form of incremental and spontaneous transnational
private rule-making?189 It depends! The nature of custom does not
change if codification is simply an instrument to collect and organize
conceptually practices developed incrementally by the business
community. If, instead, codification superimposes the codifiers’
view, be them academics or practitioners, to what happens in
practice, it changes the nature of custom. A business association that
defines strict rules and strong barriers to entry for those subject to
the rules does not fit with this definition of custom and is much
closer to an industry self-regulatory regime. For the purpose of the
comparison, the article considers forms of custom’s codification that
reflect the evolution of practices rather than the conceptual
framework of the codifiers. The legitimacy and authority of custom
is based on the community’s practice and consent. However, the
functional difference between custom and private regulation
remains even when including codifications that transform the
incremental process and crystallize it into private legislation.
Customary rules are ‘exchange facilitators’. Customary rules are not
meant primarily to regulate market failures. At most, they reduce
transaction costs by creating common trading rules that harmonize
or standardize practices.190 They do not have stated regulatory
objectives like those defined in TPR: complying with rule of law and
human rights, increasing product safety and environmental
protection, enhancing transparency in financial markets, or more
industrial policy oriented objectives such as increasing the volume
of trade, internationalizing markets, and granting SMEs access to
global supply chains.
In addition, as it is clearly showed by Choi and Gulati, the
presence of a transnational private regulator like ISDA permits
immediate and coherent reactions to courts’ (mis)interpretation of
188
This has been demonstrated, in relation to agriculture, through the
regulations enacted by different exchanges such as those in New York and Chicago.
189
It clearly does for those who believe that custom is oral and not written
since by definition codification implies shifting from verbal to written. However
the process of custom’s codification is old and goes back to Roman and medieval
law. Medieval jurists believed that ‘consuetudo’ could be codified. See Gilissen
Consuetudine, supra note 152, ¶ 3, 18.
190
See FRANCESCO PARISI & VINCY FON, THE ECONOMICS OF LAWMAKING (2009);
ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
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the regulatory regime that cannot be triggered when ‘impersonal’
markets without a visible hand are at work.191 This is the case in
custom, where dispersed and uncoordinated market players cannot
define an effective regulatory strategy to counteract ‘unexpected’
judicial interpretations.
7.

COMPARING PRIVATE TRANSNATIONAL FORMS OF RULEMAKING: DIFFERENCES AND COMMON FEATURES

The foregoing analysis shows that the role of private actors in
global rule-making differs quite significantly across sectors and it is
not easily reconcilable within a single set of distinct features. The
differences can be analyzed along four dimensions: actors,
procedures, instruments and effects.
7.1. Actors
The differences between custom and TPR in relation to actors are
remarkable. Custom is characterized, even in its broadest spectrum,
by the involvement of merchants. Civil society organizations do not
play a significant role in the development of customary commercial
rules. Interests of private actors in custom are generally aligned and
homogenous or, better, become aligned and homogenous at the end
of the process.192 TPR, on the contrary, is characterized by a much
broader variety of private actors participating in the rule-making
process with different objectives. Within the industry, different and
often conflicting interests exist.193 Conflicts may reflect size (which
191 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 138 at 149 (comparing the pari passu clause
in sovereign debt contracts and derivatives swap contracts based on ISDA master
agreement. “The existence of ISDA allows the swaps market to respond to
unexpected court interpretations of contractual ambiguities much differently than
the sovereign debt market”).
192 Custom becomes legally binding only when interests are aligned and there
is consensus.
193
Recently, the conflicts over transnational standard setting and
implementation have also involved SMEs. A typical conflict is between
multinationals and SMEs operating within the same regimes like in the
agricultural-food industry. They have different capacities to comply and are often
involved in distributional conflicts concerning the allocation of compliance’s costs
with the standards.
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in turn reflects different technological and financial capabilities) as
those between multinationals and smallholders or may arise
between producers and retailers within global chains.194 The
existence of conflicting objectives is reflected both on governance
and standard setting procedures.
The changes towards wider interests’ representation in TPR are
mainly stimulated or even led by CSOs. CSOs often represent
interests conflicting with those of firms, i.e. the regulated entities.
CSOs can play either a leading role running governing the scheme
themselves or an ancillary role, taking part in governance
organizations that run the regulatory process. Increasingly TPR
regimes include tripartite (multistakeholder) organizations
encompassing states or governments, in addition to industries and
CSOs.195 The involvement of public actors and CSOs is often the sign
of the public interest goal playing a more relevant role in TPR than
in custom.
Hence, TPR is increasingly moving towards wider participation
and inclusion as a response to the accountability deficit criticisms.
The inclusiveness of the regulatory process, which might not always
be reflected in the organizational governance, answers the need to
involve constituencies without membership that nevertheless may
be (negatively) affected by the implementation of the standards.
Similar trends are not observable in contemporary law merchants’
making. When drafting standard contracts forms the International
chamber of commerce (ICC) does not involve the potentially
affected stakeholders who may either gain or lose from the adoption
of specific contractual clauses. At ICC drafting contracts is
conceived rather as a technical process that involves practitioners in
the field. No impact analysis is carried to evaluate losers and
194 See S. Henson and J. Humphrey, The Impact of Private Food Safety Standards
on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-setting Processes (May 2009) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/sps/docs/private_standa
rds_codex_en.pdf (prepared for FAO/WHO); Joint FAO/Who Food Standards
Program, ‘Codex Alimentarius Commission, 33rd Session, Consideration of the
Impact of Private Standards’ (Geneva, Switzerland, 5-9 July 2010) available at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex../Meetings/CAC/cac33/cac33_13e.pdf.
195
See the membership of ICOC available at http://www.icocpsp.org/uploads/Signatory_Companies_-_September_2013_-_Composite_List2.
pdf, the one of the Round table on sustainable biofuel available at
http://www.rspo.org/members?keywords=&member_type=&member_
category=&member_country=All), and similarly the one of the Round table on
sustainable palm oil (available at http://rsb.org/about/organization/memberlist/).
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winners and the distributional effects of model contract drafting.
The compromise among conflicting interests is limited to the
dialogue between enterprises represented within ICC without the
active involvement of other stakeholders!
Custom, to become legally binding, presupposes some degree of
interest homogeneity and a relative cohesive business community.
TPR on the contrary is often based on the co-existence of conflicting
interests and objectives. Its binding nature is compatible with
conflicts. This distinction results in different organizational and
governance responses and enforcement mechanisms.
7.2. Procedures
The formation of legally binding custom is incremental and
decentralized.196 It is retrospective and backward looking. The
process of customary rule-making is based on consolidation of
practices among traders belonging to the (broadly speaking) same
community.197 Such consolidation can occur in different ways,
ranging from hard codification to collection of references, to
practices identified by experts.198 The personal scope of custom is
often undetermined. There is not a legal definition of the relevant
community to which custom is applied and the determination of
communities’ boundaries often occurs through ex post litigation.
Transnational regulatory regimes operate as private legislatures
with procedures that determine ex ante the different stages of the
rule-making process.199 They are prospective and forwardlooking.
TPR is neither incremental nor decentralized. It is generally
designed by a regulator on the basis of standard setting procedures;
196 The term decentralized has kin this context a Hayekian connotation. See
Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach
to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1700 (1996); Eric A.
Posner, Law, Economics and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996); Avery
Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1752 (1996).
197 In medieval times, these rules applied to the members of guilds and the
relationships between them. Only exceptionally they were applied to foreign
merchants and almost never to non-merchants.
198 The legal value of these codifications changes accordingly. The recognition
of the binding force may differ depending on the internal or external perspective:
whether it is seen from the community of traders or from the legislation.
199 Id.
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it is not the product of a spontaneous aggregation of regulated
entities’ conducts.200 It has increasingly become formalized.
Procedural requirements have been introduced to protect the
interests of affected stakeholders who, lacking membership, cannot
use the organizational toolkit that provides participatory and voting
rights. Different issues concern those negatively affected by the
standard and those that can suffer harm from non-compliance. The
latter are stakeholders that would benefit from the standard when it
is complied with.201 The former bear the costs of the standard’s
implementation. Both potentially conflicting interests have to be
taken into account according to many TPR procedures.202
Many regimes are binding at time of birth: an incremental
process is not required to achieve the status of a binding set of
rules.203 What may be incremental is the degree of compliance
according to the logic of continuous improvement. Full compliance
is frequently subject to a timeline, depending on the capabilities of
each regulated entity to meet the requirements.204 Hence the rules
are immediately binding but compliance may be subject to different
time horizons depending on the size, in particular the financial and
administrative skills, of regulated entities.
Depending on the personal or territorial scope TPR may adopt
different institutional designs. Where the scope is territorial both
standard setting and compliance may encompass multiple
‘administrative’ levels. In order to accommodate local differences
the regime may be composed of two, and increasingly three layers,
including one global, one regional and one national level.205 Such a
For this distinction see New Foundations, supra note 68, at 31.
See id. at 32.
202 For a broader analysis see R. Stewart, Disregard, supra at note 66.
203 As we have seen, there are a small number of regimes where the rules are
not binding and compliance is recommended. This is the case of EASA the private
regulator operating in the field of advertising where the main tool is represented
by best practices recommended to the national SROs.
204
See, e.g., the UTZ Certified, Core Code of Conduct Version 1.0 (2014),
available at http://www.utzcertified-trainingcenter.com/ewExternalFiles/EN%
20UTZ%20Core%20Code%20for%20Individual%20Certification%202014.pdf.
Under the UTZ Core Code of Conduct, compliance with the requirements can be
achieved over 4 years. The Code defines mandatory voluntary (additional)
requirements and their ration changes over time. The first year is 60/60, the second
year is 87/33, the third is 103/17 and the fourth is 113/7. Over the 4 years 53
requirements shift from voluntary to mandatory.
205
See, for example, in the field of certification the model adopted by
GLOBALGAP or in the field of advertising the model adopted by EASA.
200

201
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multilevel structure is missing when the scope is designed
functionally rather than territorially. The relevant community of
regulated entities is identified by formal rules that define both the
membership and the effects of the rules. As we have seen, the
predominant is membership-based while the alternative model is
that of free or for sale standards to which regulated entities can
individually commit.206 In the latter case, the community is shaped
by individual choices of regulated entities that subscribe to the
regime. Absent membership and organizational forms, regulated
entities do not form a cohesive group and lack decision-making
power. The collective dimension is very limited and the relationship
between regulators and regulated rather loose. It is the use of the
standard and its market share that determines the success or the
failure of the regime.
7.3. Instruments
The rule-making and enforcement instruments also differ.
Usages and customs arise out of contractual practices by individual
traders that consolidate over time and may be collected in private
or intergovernmental codifications. There is not a single regulator,
rather the regulatory process is based on incremental consolidation
of decentralized practices. Once usages and customs become
binding, members of the trading community may be bound by the
rules unless they opt out. Up to that moment, parties have to opt in
the usages or custom, making a specific and express commitment.
Within usages, the collection of contract terms and clauses is rather
common. The creation of a market might be the outcome of the
process of developing customary rules. As we have seen,
transnational contract forms and terms are also used in private
regulation. In the latter case, however, they primarily serve the
purpose of implementing international public and private
standards; broadening their scope by pursuing regulatory
objectives. The existence of conflicting interests typical of TPR does
not prevent the standardization of contracts by the transnational
regulator. On the contrary! Once the compromise is reached on the
206
This commitment can occur on the basis of an agreement between the
standard setter and the regulated entities (for example in the case of GFSI or that of
Equator principles with the adoption agreement) or on the basis of a unilateral
declaration or a code of conduct enacted by the regulated entity.
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standard or on the framework contract, deviations from standards
by individually regulated entities are much rarer in TPR than in
customary law.
In TPR, the standards are defined ex ante through detailed
standard setting procedures that are followed by regulators.
Regulatory instruments to design and implement standards vary
depending on the functions they perform: codes of conduct,
rulebooks, guidelines and best-practice recommendations. The use
of regulatory contracts suggests that the process of norm making is
consensual, but consent by regulated entities is expressed ex ante.
Contracts are commonly used to implement transnational
regulatory standards. In order to reduce transaction costs and
harmonize rules among market or supply chain participants, private
regulators design standard contract forms or suggest incorporation
of standard terms and conditions in commercial contracts by
regulated entities between them or with third parties. The standard
is articulated in a code of conduct or in guidelines and rulebooks
and then applied by parties in a commercial contract.
If standards address externalities, they state principles that
regulated entities have to “transpose” into contractual clauses when
engaging third parties. In product safety, if the code of conduct
imposes compliance with a hazard analysis control point (HACCP),
the parties have to define contractual terms, rights, and obligations
that can implement a safety management scheme. In advertising,
the advertiser and the media include contract clauses concerning
compliance with codes related to deceptiveness, fairness, and
decency.207 TPR deploys contracts to implement standards. Safety
standards produced by IATA in relation to civil aviation are
incorporated in bilateral or multiparty production contracts
between airlines and their suppliers.208 Data protection standards
are incorporated into contracts between search engines and
consumers.209 Privacy policies are incorporated into sales contracts
207
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ADVERTISING AND
MARKETING COMMUNICATION PRACTICE, Consolidated International Chamber of
Commerce Code, art. 26 (explaining advertising and marketing communication
marketing practices).
208
See Brian F. Havel and Gabriel S. Sanchez, The Emerging Lex Aviatica, 42
GEO. J. INT’L L. 639, 639 (2011) (detailing industry standards in international
commercial air travel).
209 See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE.COM, https://www.google.it/intl/en/
policies/terms/regional.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2015) (“Google’s privacy
policies explain how we treat your personal data and protect your privacy when
you use our Services. By using our Services, you agree that Google can use such
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between electronic platforms and customers.210 Human rights
regimes are incorporated in contracts between diamond producers
and retailers211 or in contracts between private military companies
and their customers.212 Human rights regimes are incorporated in
lending contracts between banks and other financial institutions and
borrowers, as with the Equator principles.213
data in accordance with our privacy policies. We respond to notices of alleged
copyright infringement and terminate accounts of repeat infringers according to the
process set out in the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act. We provide
information to help copyright holders manage their intellectual property online. If
you think somebody is violating your copyrights and want to notify us, you can
find information about submitting notices and Google’s policy about responding to
notices in our Help Center.”); See also, Yahoo Terms of Service, YAHOO.COM,
https://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/terms/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2015)
(“By accessing and using the Yahoo Services, you accept and agree to be bound by
the terms and provision of the TOS. In addition, when using particular Yahoo
owned or operated services, you and Yahoo shall be subject to any posted
guidelines or rules applicable to such services, which may be posted and modified
from time to time. All such guidelines or rules (including but not limited to our
Spam Policy) are hereby incorporated by reference into the TOS. Yahoo may also
offer other services that are governed by different Terms of Service. In such cases
the other terms of service will be posted on the relevant service to which they
apply.”).
210
See eBay User Agreement, eBay.com, http://pages.ebay.com/help/
policies/user-agreement.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2015) (“This User Agreement,
the User Privacy Notice, the Mobile Devices Terms and all policies posted on our
sites set out the terms on which eBay offers you access to and use of our sites,
services, applications and tools (collectively “Services”). You can find an overview
of our policies here. All policies, the Mobile Devices Terms, and the User Privacy
Notice are incorporated into this User Agreement. You agree to comply with all
the above when accessing or using our Services.”).
211
See System of Warranties, WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, https://www.
worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/resources/documents/System%20of%20W
arranties%20WDC%202014.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2015) (requiring each buyer
and seller of rough diamonds, polished diamonds and jewelry containing
diamonds to make the following affirmative statement on all invoices: “The
diamonds herein invoiced have been purchased from legitimate sources not
involved in funding conflict and in compliance with United Nations resolutions.
The seller hereby guarantees that these diamonds are conflict free, based on
personal knowledge and/or written guarantees provided by the supplier of these
diamonds.”).
212 See Laura Dickinson, Public/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT
(Jody Freeman & Martha Mino eds., 2009) (detailing the pervasive outsourcing of
U.S. government work to private actors and the clash with traditional American
values); Carsten Hoppe & Ottavio Quirico, Codes of Conduct for Private Military and
Security Companies, in WAR BY CONTRACT 362 (Francesco Francioni & Natalino
Ronzitti eds., 2011) (explaining the state of self-regulation in the military and
security industry).
213
See, Guidance for EPFIS on Incorporating Environmental and Social
Considerations into Loan Documentation, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
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If the purpose of the regulatory regime designing a market,
rather than implementing a standard, the regulatory instrument
imposes or recommends to traders the use of executory contracts
that partly reflect the framework or master agreement and partly
regulate the specific relationship.214 This can be done in different
ways: (1) through standardized bilateral contracts designed by the
regulator; (2) through a multiparty contract applicable to all trading
partners; or (3) through a rulebook that defines contractual terms to
be applied by individual traders in their contractual relationships.
Instruments of private regulation are not confined within
contracts. In TPR, a wider variety of instruments is deployed,
ranging from property rights to regulatory contracts; from the law
of associations and foundations to corporate and trust law.215
Enforcement mechanisms differ between custom and TPR.
While merchant courts are composed by members of the same
business community using primarily non-legal sanctions, in TPR
enforcement is increasingly performed by third parties independent from standard setters - subject to formalized
procedural rules implementing due process, fair trial, and effective
remedies principles. At times, the vertical relationship between
enforcer and disputants is supplemented by peer monitoring in
order to implement reputational mechanisms.
In TPR the
sanctioning system is often the result of a combination of legal and
extra-legal sanctions. These differences with law merchants can be
explained by the degrees of heterogeneity and conflicts within the
private sphere and by the relevance of regulatory beneficiaries and

http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/ep_guidance_for_epfis_on_
loan_documentation_march_2014.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2015)) (“It is not a
requirement to include the Equator Principles Action Plan as an Annex in
the loan agreement. If an Equator Principles Action Plan has been agreed, the loan
agreement should, as a minimum, contain a reference to this plan, and/or
conditions precedent/subsequent in order to have the clients’ commitment to
comply with the plan.” However, it further affirms “Where a client is not in
compliance with its environmental and social covenants, the EPFI will work with
the client on remedial actions to bring it back into compliance to the extent feasible.
If the client fails to re-establish compliance within an agreed grace period, the EPFI
reserves the right to exercise remedies, as considered appropriate.”).
214
See Choi & Gulati, supra note 138, at 149 (showing the distinction between
economic and noneconomic terms).
215
Depending on the legal form of the regulatory body, the relationship
between regulators and regulated is subject to the law of association or nonprofit
corporations or to that of contract law. In the latter instance the regulated is bound
by a regulatory contract signed with the organization.
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third parties in private regulation.216 Merchant courts work in a
context of homogenous communities where interests are usually
aligned.217
When interests and objectives are divergent or
conflicting, more formalized and impartial enforcement regimes
become necessary.
The other factor influencing different
enforcement mechanisms is the role of affected stakeholders. As we
have seen, different issues concern those negatively affected by the
standard if implemented and those that can suffer harm from noncompliance.218
The latter should be considered regulatory
beneficiaries of the regime, but may suffer detriment for
infringements of the standard. The communities of stakeholders
that may be positively affected by compliance require access to
dispute resolution mechanisms to limit the negative consequences
of non-compliance. The effectiveness of regulatory regimes is
primarily (albeit not exclusively) dependent upon their ability to
participate in the rule-making process and have access to ex post
internal review.219
7.4. Effects
The definition of “effects” concerns the personal scope of the
private regime based on customary or regulatory law. To whom
does it apply? How is the domain of application defined and by
whom? What is the shape of the community of regulated entities?
Custom applies primarily to the community of traders, but it can
extend beyond the community.220 How such a community is defined
Id.
Medieval merchant courts applied lex mercatoria also to relationships with
non-merchants, generally protecting merchants’ interests at the expenses of other
communities like artisans or agricultural producers. Current merchant courts
apply almost exclusively to relationships among merchants, whereas transnational
private law (the contemporary jus commune) applies to relationships between
merchants and non-merchants.
218 See Stewart Disregard, supra note 84, at 213 (explaining the relative harms of
bad implementation and non-compliance).
219 An important function is also played by domestic courts exercising judicial
review. However, legal systems distinguish the judicial power to review regulation
depending on their public or private nature or on the pursuit of public interest and
public function.
220
Baldo degli Ubaldi, and then Benvenuto Stracca (tractatus de mercatura
seu mercatore), distinguished between the power to regulate and the personal
scope of the regulation. See Baldo In Decretalium Volumen Commentaria, Venetiis,
216
217
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is not clearly determined. Within the codification process of custom,
there is often an effort to define the boundaries of the community,
but many times its extent is variable and flexible.
In TPR the instruments to define the regime’s personal scope are
much clearer: as to the regulated entities it is (1) membership when
the regime is regulated by an organization-like association, or it is
(2) contract between the regulator and the regulated when the
foundational model is deployed.221 However, the regulatory
function of the private regime implies that the standard’s
implementation produces effects on third parties; the consumers,
the investors, the human rights holders would benefit from
compliance and be harmed by infringements. When a standard
defines the safety of a product, compliance reduces consumer risks,
whereas the lack of compliance increases them. These forms of
regulation differ from conventional self-regulation because there is
no coincidence between regulators and regulated.
A second important difference of effects concerns the distinction
between territorial and functional scope. Custom, according to the
more recent findings, tends to be local and geographically
circumscribed. TPR is often defined functionally. The relevant
community of regulated is identified by the regulatory objectives safety, financial stability, and consumer protection, and by the
geographical location of the regulated entities. In fact, the different
geographical operations of global supply chain make the territorial
scope hard to define.

MDXCV, c. 104 v.n. 48, (“Quaero ecce mercatores habent judicem mercantiae,
nunquid non merctarores possunt eius jurisditionem prorogare seu adire? Resp.
non: quia municipalis non potest prorogari seu ampliari. . .” quoted by V.
Piergiovanni, Statuti diritto comune e processo mercantile, in Norme, scienza e
pratica giuridica tra Genova e l’occidente medievale e moderno, Genova, 2012, p.
1105 ff at . 1108 fn. 15 stating: “Piu’ complesso il problema della validita’ degli
statuti presso altri tribunali: Baldo non ne accetta la limitazione per i soli iscritti alla
corporazione, ma esclude che i giudici ordinari possano applicare disposizioni
statutarie che non riguardano i mercatores ma siano relative ai giudici mercantili
stessi e all’ordo juris.”).
221
See Cafaggi, supra note 2, at 14, 17 (comparing different modes of
transnational private regulation).
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Actors
Merchants

Procedures
Undefined, both
oral and written

Instruments
Collection of
customs,
with
contract
terms and
clauses

Effects
Binding on
the
community
with opt out
possibilities

Manufactu
rers,
retailers,
SMEs. Civil
society
organizatio
ns, States,
Internation
al
organizatio
ns

Written.
Standards
setting codes,
auditing and
reporting,
independent
evaluation
mechanisms

Regulatory
contracts,
Reports

Binding on
the
members
even in
disputes
with third
parties

In light of the foregoing differences, what are the implications
concerning the foundations of private norm-making power? Is there
a common foundation of private rule-making or does it differ?
The different features suggest that foundations of transnational
private rule-making are not the same in Custom and TPR. While,
in the case of custom, private autonomy and freedom of contract can
be the source of legitimacy, this is certainly not enough in TPR. The
legitimacy of a transnational regulatory regime cannot depend only
on the consent of the parties that join the regime since the effects go
beyond their respective spheres. Many stakeholders affected by the
standard are unable to express consent or dissent. What provides
legitimacy to the regulatory regime is not only the expression of
consent by regulated entities, but also the inclusiveness, the
transparency of the process, and proportionality of the regulatory
product (the standard). Procedural requirements related to the
process and the final regulatory products are a necessary
component of the legitimacy towards affected stakeholders that do
not belong to the community of regulated entities. The validity of
these rules depends on their legitimacy. Consent by the regulated
is not enough; affected stakeholders have to participate and confer
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(input and throughput) legitimacy.222 When judicially reviewed,
transnational private regimes can be stricken down by judges even
if they have been expressly consented upon. Private autonomy and
consent are necessary, but are not sufficient conditions to ensure
normative character to the rules. They have to be combined with
procedural rules that grant third parties access and control, enabling
contestation, e.g., access to dispute resolution.
8.

AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

To map and to understand transnational private law making, it
is essential to make comparisons among the different modes of the
standards’ production and the various domains over which they
develop, stabilize, and decline. “What are the combinations
between legal and social norms in standard setting and
enforcement” is a key question to differentiate the various forms.
Comparative analysis of transnational private regulation, customs,
and jura mercatorum is at its very early stage. Issues concerning (1)
why different private regimes emerge, (2) how they spread, and (3)
why they decline over time are still largely unexplored. As to TPR,
such questions have been raised in relation to specific sectors. But
comprehensive inter-sectoral analyses are still lacking. These forms,
it has been contended here, have existed for a long time and
developed in connection with the transformations of the public
sphere and, in the last centuries, of the State as the dominant unit of
analysis.223
Four themes should be subject to further comparative
investigation: (1) the different functional partition between local
and global private regimes (more specifically, a comparison

222
Id. at 11 (outlining the common interests of the regulated and the
stakeholders); Cafaggi, supra note 68, at 4 (explaining the role stakeholders can play
in regulation).
223 See Edward Ballesein, Rights of Way, Red Flags, and Safety Valves: Business
Self-Regulation and State-Building in the United States 1 (Kenan Institute for Ethics,
Working Paper No. 1, 2012) (telling the history behind self-regulation in the U.S.
business community). See also Edward Ballesein & Marc Eisner, The Promise and
Pitfalls of Co-Regulation: How Governments Can Draw on Private Governance for Public
Purpose, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 127 (David Moss & John Cisternino
eds., 2009) (examining the role nongovernmental actors can play in regulatory
development); William Novak, Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction,
in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 23 (Jody Freeman & Martha Mino eds., 2009).
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between domestic and transnational forms of private regulation); (2)
the techniques (i.e., indicators) to measure the success and failure of
transnational private regulation and custom; (3) the different modes
of integrating transnational private rules into domestic and
international public legal orders; and (4) the different distributional
impacts and effects of private regulation and customary rules.
Other relevant aspects of a research agenda include: the use of
private regulation and custom to regulate, increase or decrease
competition, the different nature of legal and non-legal instruments,
and the various criteria to draw the boundaries between social and
legal norms.
Both TPR and customs include local and global components.
The local or global nature of rulemaking is not a static feature. Local
customs and regimes have become global, gaining dominance over
competitors. Global customs and regulatory regimes have declined
and, in some instances, have become local, whereas in other
instances they have altogether disappeared. Studying TPR and
customs from an evolutionary perspective demonstrates that the
boundaries between local and global are diachronically mobile and
sector or market specific.
The debate on transnational private law making is often
characterized by lack of data concerning their effectiveness.
Effectiveness should be measured within the private sphere both
between alternative modes and between private and public regimes.
We still lack appropriate indicators that can be used to engage in a
comparative analysis instrumental to policy decision-making.224
Both transnational regulation and customary rules have huge
distributional impacts.
They transfer power, wealth, and
capabilities between communities of private actors, between
communities and states and between states. The dominance of a
regulatory regime or that of a custom marks the temporary victory
of one standard over competing ones and has large socioeconomic
impacts on communities, transferring wealth and power within and
between them. The nature and features of distributional effects are
largely unexplored both by the transnational regulators and by the
institutions engaged in collecting customs.
It is strongly

224 See Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 9, at 115 (explaining the use of indicators
in measuring regulations). For a general overview of indicators as instruments of
governance see Davis & Kingsbury, INDICATORS AS GOVERNANCE, OUP, 2013.
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recommended that shared indicators to measure distributional
impacts be used in policy design by international organizations.225
A fourth area is that of integration of transnational private
standards into both domestic and international legal orders. How
are customs and regulatory regimes integrated?
There are
important contributions concerning the technique of incorporation,
but many other techniques have developed to provide private
regimes a legal status and ensure general application. Open issues
concern the applicability of domestic techniques of legal integration
to transnational private standards. Recent research on the EU shows
that a piecemeal approach, rather than a coordinated and consistent
approach, is used to integrate transnational standards into the EU
legal order.226 Similarly the UN system does not have general
principles to define forms of private standards’ integration. The
WTO code of practice represents a point of reference but it does not
say much about integration into domestic legal orders and its effects.
9. CONCLUSION
Transnational regulatory regimes generated by private actors
have witnessed a rapid and unexpected increase. This process has
been caused by significant transformations in global value chains,
global trade and international markets, combined with a stronger
role played by CSOs. This article has delved into whether the newly
created regimes resemble and can be easily associated to
conventional jura mercatorum and customs. This question has both
theoretical and practical implications. From the theoretical and
historical viewpoint, it asks whether TPR simply constitutes a
development of jus mercatorum and customary law or reflects
different needs connected to the changing instruments and
objectives of international public policies related to market design
and regulation. From the policy perspectives, it forces one to rethink
different approaches to transnational private rulemaking by states
and international organizations.

225 For example, the OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises and their
impact on global supply chains should be supported by a much deeper
distributional analysis of the standards.
226 See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Integrating Global Standards into the European Union, on
file with the author.
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The new forms differ from both custom and jura mercatorum.
Differences concern both processes and objectives. The new private
regulatory regimes are generated by different private actors - often
with conflicting interests - through processes similar to those
deployed in public legislation or international treaty making. The
new regimes are trying to address these conflicts by internalizing
trade-offs within the same standard avoiding or mitigating the
conflicts. TPR is neither incremental nor decentralized.227 However,
it is multilevel and composed of two (and increasingly, three) layers
including a global, a regional, and a national level when the scope is
geographic.228 In TPR, standard setting and enforcement procedures
are defined and approved ex ante. For rulemaking, monitoring, and
enforcement private regulators are bound to abide by the rules
designed by themselves or by meta private regulators.
Customs, on the contrary, are generally created by homogenous
communities that produce legal rules through repeat behavior.
They become binding on the communities retrospectively, after
sufficient consent becomes clear. It is gradual, incremental, and
unstable. The legal requirements that transform a business practice
into a legally binding rule do not address the issue of external
negative effects.
Functionally, TPRs are characterized by regulatory functions
that not only address different types of market failures but also solve
collective action problems in contexts where states’ regulatory
capacities are limited at best. Customs, on the other hand, regulate
exchanges and trading, but rarely address externalities and the
production of public goods.
Unlike jus mercatorum and custom, where private collective
autonomy constitutes the foundations of rule-making power and
provides the legitimacy of their normativity, these new regimes
involve third parties’ interests to a much greater extent. The public
interest function - which differentiates them from conventional selfregulation - calls for procedural and substantive requirements that
ensure legitimacy and effectiveness. Collective private autonomy is
integrated and limited by the pursuit of public interest and the
necessity to comply with the rule of law.
These differences suggest that the relationship with public
orders - both at the transnational and domestic level - should be
This is not to say that it is not evolutionary and multilevel.
Such a multilevel structure is lacking when the scope is functional and not
territorial.
227
228
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regulated differently from custom and other forms of privately
produced rules. The techniques of incorporation, usually applied to
usages and customs, cannot be mechanically transplanted to TPRs.
The legal status of these regimes and their binding nature can be
certainly evaluated through the lenses of contract and
organizational law. However, the applicability of these regimes to
parties that have not participated in the regulatory process in any
meaningful way should be subject to complementary forms of
inclusion. Clearly, tacit consent of the community, the milestone of
custom’s normativity, cannot play a role to transform regulatory
regimes into binding rules. It is the combination of private
autonomy and procedural requirements that ultimately provides
the necessary legitimacy to ensure compliance with global private
standards.
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